Crisis-Driven Tax Law: The Case of Section 382 by Choi, Albert H. et al.
University of Michigan Law School 
University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository 
Articles Faculty Scholarship 
2019 
Crisis-Driven Tax Law: The Case of Section 382 
Albert H. Choi 
University of Michigan Law School, alchoi@umich.edu 
Quinn Curtis 
University of Virginia School of Law, qcurtis@virginia.edu 
Andrew T. Hayashi 
University of Virginia School of Law, ath9f@virginia.edu 
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/articles/2101 
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/articles 
 Part of the Administrative Law Commons, Banking and Finance Law Commons, Legislation 
Commons, and the Tax Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Choi, Albert. "Crisis-Driven Tax Law: The Case of Section 382." Quinn Curtis and Andrew T. Hayashi, co-
authors. Fla. Tax Rev. 23, no. 1 (2019): 1-72. 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at University of Michigan Law 
School Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Articles by an authorized administrator of 
University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact 
mlaw.repository@umich.edu. 
FLORIDA TAX REVIEW
Volume 23 2019 Number 1
CRISIS-DRIVEN TAX LAW: THE CASE OF SECTION 382
by
Albert H. Choi, Quinn Curtis, and Andrew T Hayashi*
ABSTRACT
At the peak of the 2008financial crisis, the Internal Revenue Service
(IRS) issued Notice 2008-83 (the Notice), administrative guidance that
limited Internal Revenue Code (the Code) section 382, an important tax
rule designed to discourage tax-motivated acquisitions. Although styled
as a mere interpretation of existing law, the Notice has been widely
viewed as an improper exercise of the IRS's authority that undermined
its legitimacy. But did the Notice work? There were many extraordinary
interventions during the financial crisis that raised questions about
eroding the rule of law and the long-term destabilizing effects of bail-
outs. In a financial crisis, regulators must weigh these real, but distant
and uncertain, costs against the immediate benefits of the intervention.
Toward that end, we report the first evidence of the effects of limiting
Code section 382 during the 2008financial crisis. Although we find lit-
tle evidence that the Notice affected bank merger activity, those merg-
ers that occurred while the Notice was in effect produced lower
post-merger income growth. The results suggest that Code section 382
* The authors are Professor of Law at University of Michigan Law
School and Albert Clark Tate, Jr., Professor of Law and Class of 1948 Profes-
sor of Scholarly Research in Law at the University of Virginia School of Law,
respectively. We are grateful to Brian Galle, Rich Hynes, Kate Judge, Jim
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the National Tax Association, 2017 American Law and Economics Associa-
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may have some benefits in terms of discouraging tax-motivated acqui-
sitions. We use the Notice to illustrate the concerns that should guide
lawmakers' decisions about if and how to make law during a crisis.
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INTRODUCTION
There is an old adage that hard cases make bad law,1 but what about hard
times? In times of crisis, regulators face enormous pressure to bend rules
and stretch regulations, sometimes to the breaking point. Thousands of
pages have been written on the response of bank regulators to the 2008
financial crisis. In the aftermath of the crisis, scholars of financial reg-
ulation have sought ways to contain regulators' discretion in times of
crisis while also facing the reality that aggressive intervention during a
financial panic might stave off economic disaster. Tax law has been
largely overlooked in this discussion. This Article examines a critical
change to tax law that was made to support the banking sector during
the financial crisis but that has not attracted scholarly attention. By
studying this intervention, we shed light on both the importance of the
underlying tax provision and the usefulness of tax law in responding to
an economic emergency.
At the height of the financial crisis in the fall of 2008, the Inter-
nal Revenue Service (IRS) released a remarkable piece of administra-
tive guidance. Issued on September 30th of that year and less than a page
long, IRS Notice 2008-83 (the Notice) was styled as a mere interpreta-
tion of existing law. 2 Nevertheless, the Notice had a dramatic effect on
the value of banks' tax assets.3 The Notice effectively turned off an
aspect of Code section 382 that restricts the ability of a corporation to
use unrecognized tax losses from underperforming loans to offset tax-
able income from other sources if that corporation undergoes a signifi-
cant change in equity ownership, including an acquisition. The purpose
of Code section 382 is to discourage tax-motivated corporate acquisi-
tions, but during the financial crisis this policy objective came into con-
flict with the urgent need to encourage consolidation in the financial
sector and inject capital into distressed banks.
1. Northern Sec. Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197, 400 (1904)
(Holmes, J., dissenting) (stating "Great cases like hard cases make bad law.").
One prominent scholar has raised questions about whether all cases make bad
law: Frederick Schauer, Do Cases Make Bad Law?, 73 U. CHI. L. REv. 883
(2006).
2. See Notice 2008-83, 2008-2 C.B. 905.
3. See id. Tax assets include net operating loss carryforwards,
credits, and other tax attributes that can be used to reduce tax liability.
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The direct result of the guidance was that the unrecognized
losses on target banks' loan portfolios, which otherwise would have been
impaired following an acquisition, could be fully utilized by an acquirer,
thereby making banks with distressed loans much more attractive to
potential acquirers. There was also a distributional consequence of free-
ing up tax assets for potential acquirers: acquisition targets with these
tax assets became more attractive to more profitable acquirers, because
the more profitable an acquirer is the more rapidly it can exploit those
tax assets to offset their taxable income. This implication played out only
a few days after the Notice was issued when Wells Fargo re-entered
negotiations for the acquisition of Wachovia and outbid Citibank after
determining that its ability to utilize Wachovia's tax assets would allow
it to acquire Wachovia without FDIC assistance.4 One estimate placed
the value of the Notice in respect of Wachovia's tax assets to Wells Fargo
at roughly $20 billion.5 Controversy over the Notice, including whether
it was a proper exercise of the Treasury Department's authority and
whether it was issued specifically to favor Wells Fargo, followed
quickly and the Notice was overruled when the American Recovery
and Reinvestment Act was signed into law in early 2009.6 Thus, there
was a window of roughly three and a half months in which the Notice
was in effect and part of Code section 382 was disabled with respect to
banks.
4. See The Acquisition of Wachovia Corporation by Wells Fargo &
Company: Testimony Before the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission, BD.
GOVERNORS FED. RESERVE SYS. (Sept. 1, 2010), https://www.federalreserve.gov
/newsevents/testimony/alvarez20100901a.htm (statement of Scott G. Alvarez,
General Counsel; "Based on an IRS notice issued September 30, Wells Fargo
had determined that certain U.S. federal income tax benefits resulting from
the proposed Wachovia transaction would allow it to acquire Wachovia with-
out FDIC assistance.").For a timeline of the events, see David Enrich & Dan
Fitzpatrick, Wachovia Chooses Wells Fargo, Spurns Citi, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 4,
2008, 11:59 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB122303190029501925.
5. See Dan Freed, How Wells Fargo Won the Tax-Dodging Trophy,
THE STREET (Nov. 10, 2011, 6:35 AM), https://www.thestreet.com/story/1130
6521/1/how-wells-fargo-won-the-tax-dodging-trophy.html; see also Binyamin
Appelbaum, After Change in Tax Law, Wells Fargo Swoops In, WASH. POST,
(Oct. 4, 2008), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008
/10/03/AR2008100301042.html.
6. American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Pub. L.
No. 111-5, 123 Stat. 115 (2009).
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While it may be easy to overlook in the dramatic history of the
2008 financial crisis, the quiet release of a one-page Notice on a Friday
afternoon in late September, styled as an interpretation of an obscure
and convoluted provision of corporate tax law, sent shockwaves through
the tax world. Among scholars, reactions were generally negative on
account of its perceived illegitimacy and undermining of the rule of law.
Although described as an interpretation of Code section 382, most
observers viewed it as a substantive change in law of the kind that
requires congressional action. Among economic and business observ-
ers, the most dramatic effect of the Notice was that it enabled Wells
Fargo's 1 th-hour bid for Wachovia, setting in motion a sequence of
events that is now a case study published by Harvard Business School.'
Lost in the questions about the legal authority for the Notice,' the effects
of the Notice on the rule of law,9 and the high drama of the Wachovia
sale, were the effects of the rule change itself. Section 382 is a much-
maligned provision of the Code. Its detractors argue that it imposes
burdensome costs on corporations that must track ownership of their
stock to avoid triggering its draconian consequences, and further argue
that it can be triggered by ordinary business transactions that do not
pose a risk of the abusive "loss trafficking" that motivated the adoption
of Code section 382 in the first place.
This is the first Article to examine the impact of Notice 2008-
83 and, more generally, the effects of Code section 382. The adoption
and subsequent repeal of the Notice presents a unique opportunity to
explore the significance of taxes in the merger decision and contribute
to a literature with mixed results on the importance of taxes in that con-
text.1" In general, the evidence suggests the effects of taxes (including
7. Guhan Subramanian & Nithyasri Sharma, Citigroup-Wachovia-
Wells Fargo (Nov. 2011) (unpublished Harvard Business School Case 910-006).
8. See, e.g., Nathaniel Cushman, Comment, The Impact of Illegal
Tax Guidance: Notice 2008-83, 62 TAX LAW. 867 (2008).
9. See Alice G. Abreu & Richard K. Greenstein, Tax as Everylaw:
Interpretation, Enforcement, and the Legitimacy of the IRS, 69 TAX LAW. 493
(2015); Lawrence Zelenak, Custom and the Rule ofLaw in the Administration
of the Income Tax, 62 DUKE L.J. 829 (2012).
10. See, e.g., Alan J. Auerbach & David Reishus, The Impact of
Taxation on Mergers and Acquisitions, in MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS 69-86
(A.J. Auerbach ed., 1988); Alan J. Auerbach & David Reishus, Taxes and the
Merger Decision, in KNIGHTS, RAIDERS AND TARGETS: THE IMPACT OF THE Hos-
TILE TAKEOVER 301-03 (John C. Coffee, Jr., et al. eds., 1988); Julie H. Collins
20191
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shareholder-level taxes) on the frequency of acquisitions are modest, but
the effects of taxes on the price and structure of corporate acquisitions
are robust." Understanding these effects is important, not least because
tax rules such as Code section 382 that target tax-motivated acquisitions
also impose compliance and monitoring costs and create other distor-
tions in merger decisions.12 If taxes have little effect on merger activity
to begin with, then a reconsideration of these rules may be in order. Our
study exploits the unexpected nature of the Notice to disentangle cause
and effect in the relationship between tax assets and merger activity. The
Notice was a surprise to just about everyone 13 and was issued without
et al., Tax Reform and Foreign Acquisitions: A Microanalysis, 48 NAT'L TAX J.
1 (1995); Erik Devos et al., How Do Mergers Create Value? A Comparison of
Taxes, Market Power, and Efficiency Improvements as Explanations for Syn-
ergies, 22 REV. FIN. STUD. 1179 (2008); Merle M. Erickson & Shiing-wu
Wang, Tax Benefits as a Source of Merger Premiums in Acquisitions of Pri-
vate Corporations, 82 AcCT. REV. 359 (2007); Kenneth Lehn & Annette B.
Poulsen, Sources of Value in Leveraged Buyouts, in PUBLIC POLICY TOWARDS
CORPORATE TAKEOVERS 46-62 (Murray L. Weidenbaum & Kenneth W. Chil-
ton eds., 1988).
11. See Benjamin C. Ayers et al., Shareholder Taxes in Acquisition
Premiums: The Effect of Capital Gains Taxation, 58 J. FIN. 2783 (2003); Ben-
jamin C. Ayers et al., The Effect of Shareholder-Level Capital Gains Taxes on
Acquisition Structure, 79 ACCT. REV. 859 (2004); Wei-Chih Chiang et al., Pric-
ing Target NOLs in Mergers and Acquisitions from the Participating Firms'
Perspective, 30 ADVANCES ACCT. 32 (2014); Elizabeth Plummer & John R. Rob-
inson, Capital Market Evidence of Windfalls from the Acquisition of Tax Car-
ryovers, 43 NAT'L TAX J. 481 (1990). For a summary of the accounting
literature, see Sandra Betton et al., Corporate Takeovers, in HANDBOOK OF COR-
PORATE FINANCE: EMPIRICAL CORPORATE FINANCE 291-430 (B. Espen Eckbo ed.,
2d ed. 2008); Michelle Hanlon & Shane Heitzman, A Review of Tax Research,
50 J. ACCT. & ECON. 127 (2010); Douglas A. Shackelford & Terry Shevlin,
Empirical Tax Research in Accounting, 31 J. ACCT. & ECON. 321 (2001).
12. See Appendix infra for a model of how Code section 382 dis-
torts merger decisions.
13. See Grassley Seeks Inspector General Review of Treasury
Bank Merger Move, S. COMM. ON FIN. (Nov. 14, 2008), https://www.finance
•senate.gov/ranking-members-news/grassley-seeks-inspector-general-review
-of-treasury-bank-merger-move ("'Treasury's move took a lot of people by
surprise,' Grassley said. 'It was a big policy change for an agency to take
administratively. Treasury didn't involve Congress, so there were no checks
and balances to vet the policy."').
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the notice and comment process ordinarily required when the Treasury
Department promulgates regulations.14 As we discuss in Part IV, this
surprise provides a natural experiment for testing the effects of Code
section 382.
The Notice also provides lessons about how tax law might be
used by policymakers during times of economic stress. The Notice was
not the first time that substantive tax law changed during a crisis, and
not even the first time that tax law changed in a way that facilitated infu-
sions of cash from the Treasury to distressed financial institutions.
Twenty-seven years earlier, the U.S. Supreme Court decided Cottage
Savings v. Commissioner,15 a decision that inaugurated the modem "hair-
trigger" rule for the realization of gains and losses on the disposition of
property. Under current law, the exchange of property results in the real-
ization (i.e., taxable inclusion of income or, generally, deduction of
loss) of gains and losses even if that property is exchanged for other
property that is virtually indistinguishable in terms of its economic risks
and rewards. The important consequence of this rule is that taxpayers
can selectively recognize losses on property that has fallen in value while
deferring the taxation of their gains. Whatever the merits of this rule as
a general matter, the most immediate effect of the Court's decision was
to allow Savings and Loan (S&L) institutions during the S&L crisis of
the 1980s and 1990s to recognize their tax losses without running into
the regulatory difficulties that would have ensued if they had actually
sold the distressed loans that they owned.
Crisis-driven tax law is not a new phenomenon, particularly for
financial institutions. It is crucial to understand the broader context of
the financial crisis to understand the pressure to make crisis-driven tax
law, and so we provide a sketch of the context for the Notice in Part I.
In Part II, we explain the significance of Code section 382 and how it
operates to deter tax-motivated corporate acquisitions, as well as the
14. The importance of public participation in rulemaking has been
described as "axiomatic" by scholars. See Juan J. Lavilla, The Good Cause
Exemption to Notice and Comment Rulemaking Requirements Under the
Administrative Procedure Act, 3 ADMIN. L.J. 317 (1989) (citing Ernest Gell-
horn, Public Participation in Administrative Proceedings, 81 YALE L.J. 359,
369 (1972)); see also Fund for Animals v. Frizzell, 530 F.2d 982, 990 (D.C. Cir.
1975); ARTHUR EARL BONFIELD, STATE ADMINISTRATIVE RULEMAKING pt.6, § 6.4
(1986); CHARLES H. KOCH, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PRACTICE 128 (1985).
15. 499 U.S. 554 (1991).
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timeline leading up to, and following, the Notice. We then present a sim-
ple numerical example in Part III that illustrates the theoretical effect
of the Notice on bank mergers. This numerical example is derived from
a more general model of corporate acquisitions that we include in the
Appendix. Part IV reports the results of our study on the Notice. We use
data from bank regulators and merger data from the Federal Reserve to
measure changes in bank mergers around the time of the Notice. We
compare mergers during the Notice window to pre-Notice mergers and
examine whether the determinants of mergers differed before and during
the Notice window. We also present data on the post-merger perfor-
mance of Notice and pre-Notice mergers, and we present evidence
about strategic decisions made by banks to choose the timing of recog-
nition for built-in losses on their loan portfolios.
Drawing conclusions about the effect of the Notice is compli-
cated to a substantial degree by the unusual (to say the least) period
during which it was in effect. The 2008 financial crisis put enormous
stress on banks, and there is not a control group of firms subject to these
same stresses but not subject to the Notice against which banks can eas-
ily be compared to estimate the effect of the Notice. Nevertheless,
because of the importance and controversy around Code section 382 and
the absence of empirical evidence on the efficacy of such anti-avoidance
tax rules, documenting what happened when Code section 382 was par-
tially disabled, even during a period of market turmoil, provides valu-
able information.
We find only modest evidence that the Notice affected merger
activity. While there is a visible increase in mergers during the Notice
period, this period corresponds to the peak of the financial crisis and
the increase is only barely statistically significant when we control for
other determinants of merger activity, such as the TED spread.16 We find
no important differences in the determinants of mergers during the
Notice period, relative to the pre-notice period, such as we would expect
if the suspension of 382 drove a wave of tax-motivated acquisitions. All
of this is broadly consistent with the modest findings in the literature
16. TED spread, or Treasury-EuroDollar rate spread, is the differ-
ence between three-month Treasury bill and three-month LIBOR based US
dollars. TED spread is often used as an indicator of credit risk in the economy.
See James Chen, TED Spread, INVESTOPEDIA, https://www.investopedia.com
/terms/t/tedspread.asp (last updated Apr. 9, 2019).
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on the effects of taxes on merger frequency. We do, however, find that
banks that engage in acquisitions during the Notice window show lower
income growth in the two years after the Notice, consistent with results
in the existing literature about tax-motivated mergers leading to lower
operational synergies and higher acquisition premiums due to the pric-
ing of tax assets. We also find suggestive evidence that banks that merged
during the Notice window deferred recognition of the losses on their
loan portfolios to exploit the benefits of the Notice.
Although we resist drawing strong conclusions given the lim-
itations of our setting, the empirical evidence casts doubt on the view
that Code section 382 is an important constraint on tax-motivated merg-
ers. Given that Code section 382 is a costly and controversial tool for
policing tax-motivated activity and our model shows its welfare conse-
quences are ambiguous, our results provide some support for those who
question Code section 382's value. Moreover, our results provide addi-
tional evidence that taxes tend to affect merger matching and pricing,
but not frequency.
But the Notice's lessons are broader than just its importance for
tax-motivated acquisitions; it is also an example of using tax policy to
address financial panic. Given the controversy over the Notice, how
should regulators approach changes to the tax law in a future crisis? In
Part V of the Article, we describe a framework for thinking about crisis-
driven tax law, identifying some of the important procedural concerns
that should guide lawmakers' decisions about if and how to make tax
law changes that respond to the urgency of the moment without com-
promising the efficiency of the tax system once things revert to normal.
The last Part concludes.
I. REGULATORY RESPONSES TO THE FINANCIAL CRISIS
The Notice was issued during the height of the 2008 financial crisis, a
time when federal financial regulators were reaching for all available
policy levers, including some that involved questionable legal inter-
pretations, in order to avoid economic catastrophe. The Notice was
one of several interventions aimed at shoring up banks' balance sheets.
In the case of the Notice, the intended mechanism was by encouraging
banks to consolidate on favorable terms. Other interventions included
asset purchases, direct investments, and a host of ad hoc initiatives
aimed at both the financial and non-financial sector. A complete account-
ing of these actions could fill several volumes. This Part briefly
20191
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summarizes a selection of these interventions in order to provide con-
text for the Notice.
Beginning in 2007, the prices of mortgage-backed securities and
related financial instruments declined as an unprecedented rise in hous-
ing prices began to reverse.1" Many large banks carried vast quantities
of these securities on their balance sheets, regarding them as safe invest-
ments, and the decline in value was not anticipated in banks' risk pro-
jections."i As the decline accelerated, banks' capital was depleted,
pushing many institutions to the brink of failure and sparking rising
panic in the markets.19 The complexity and non-transparency of
mortgage-backed securities, as well as interconnections among the
banks, meant that investors had little information about which banks
were most vulnerable to the downturn. As a result, by the fall of 2008
and following the abrupt collapse of Lehman Brothers, 2 banks faced a
crisis that was not isolated to institutions with the greatest exposure to
mortgage-backed securities but threatened the entire financial system
as well as the broader economy. In order to stave off collapse, regula-
tors and policymakers acted aggressively to shore up the banking sec-
tor and support other financial institutions that were viewed as "too big
to fail. 21
17. See FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM'N, THE FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY
REPORT 226-27 (2011).
18. See id. at 228-29.
19. Many banks did in fact fail. For a discussion of the resolution of
these banks, see Richard M. Hynes & Steven D. Walt, Why Banks Are Not
Allowed in Bankruptcy, 67 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 985 (2010).
20. Lehman Brothers officially filed for bankruptcy on Septem-
ber 15, 2008, after a sale to Barclay's fell through on September 12, 2008. The
collapse of Lehman sent financial markets reeling, with the Dow closing down
4.4% on September 15th and the market for commercial paper-borrowing
critical to working capital for many firms-nearly seizing up in the aftermath,
marking a dangerous new phase of the crisis and spurring aggressive inter-
vention by financial regulators. See MARK T. WILLIAMS, UNCONTROLLED RISK
176-88 (2010).
21. For an extensive overview of interventions, see MARC LABONTE,
CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R44185, FEDERAL RESERVE: EMERGENCY LENDING 8 (2016);
BAIRD WEBEL & MARC LABONTE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R43413, COST OF Gov-
ERNMENT INTERVENTIONS IN THE RESPONSE TO THE FINANCIAL CRISIS: A RETROSPEC-
TIVE (2018).
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The financial crisis presented several distinct problems to pol-
icymakers. First, banks' exposure to subprime mortgage-backed secu-
rities meant that they were facing substantial losses. It was these losses
that led to the failure of Bear Stearns and Lehman Brothers.22 But losses
alone were not the only issue. It was also unclear which banks were sol-
vent and which were not, and which mortgage-backed securities were
worthless and which might still have some value." Finally, firms were
interconnected in ways that made the failure of one bank endanger the
survival of others, and these connections were opaque to investors
and-to a large degree-to regulators.24 These factors meant that the
decline in the value of mortgage-backed securities endangered the sur-
vival of relatively healthy banks as well as struggling ones, since inves-
tors couldn't easily discern which was which, and that the failure of a
large bank might have caused cascading failures of others, ultimately
drying up sources of credit on which the rest of the economy depended.
The interventions below were aimed at preventing such a scenario.
A. The Troubled Asset Relief Program
The most dramatic response to the financial crisis was the Troubled
Asset Relief Program (TARP), created by the Emergency Economic
Stabilization Act of 2008, which was signed into law by President
George W. Bush on October 3, 2008.25 TARP was designed to mitigate
the financial crisis by providing a lifeline to banks whose balance sheets
were clouded by so-called "toxic assets"-illiquid and difficult to value
financial products-from banks. The TARP legislation allocated $700
billion to the Treasury to purchase or insure assets that, in the view of
the Secretary of the Treasury and Chair of the Federal Reserve, were
necessary to promote financial stability.26 Under the Emergency Eco-
nomic Stabilization Act of 2008, banks selling assets to the Treasury
under the TARP program were required to issue warrants for non-voting
22. See FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM'N, supra note 17, at 226-27.
23. Id. at 373.
24. See, e.g., Hal S. Scott, Interconnectedness and Contagion:
Financial Panics and the Crisis of 2008 (June 26, 2014), https://papers.ssrn
.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract id-2178475.
25. Pub. L. No. 110-343, 122 Stat. 3765 (2008).
26. See FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM'N, supra note 17, at 371-76.
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shares of stock to the Treasury.27 These warrants would ensure that, if
the stock prices of the banks accessing TARP funds recovered, the
Treasury (and therefore taxpayers) would share in the value created
alongside the banks' ordinary investors.
TARP was meant to achieve several related goals. First, the
sheer size of the program was intended to boost market confidence by
signaling the government's willingness to support the financial sector.
Second, by buying toxic assets, banks would receive an injection of cap-
ital that would support lending. Third, the purchases would clarify
banks' balance sheets by removing the hard-to-value mortgage-backed
securities. Relatively quickly after the enactment of TARP, though, it
became clear that purchasing troubled assets and selling them at auc-
tion, as originally intended,28 would not provide capital to banks quickly
enough to support lending activity.29 Reacting to these concerns, the
TARP program pivoted to making direct financial investments in banks'
preferred stock.3" While this approach-taking direct financial stakes
in banks-was not the anticipated use of TARP funds, the legislation
gave enormous discretion and, by the end of 2008, the use of TARP
funds had expanded to include not just traditional financial institutions
but the auto companies as well.31
The result was an alphabet soup of hastily designed programs
meant to address the causes and symptoms of the crisis. Treasury pur-
chased more than $200 billion in bank equity as part of the Capital Pur-
chase Program (CPP).3 2 The collapsing insurance giant AIG took a
nearly $40 billion investment through the Systemically Significant Fail-
ing Institutions program.33 Treasury also purchased $20 billion in pre-
ferred stock from both Citigroup and Bank of America through the
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 373.
30. Id.
31. See David M. Herszenhorn & David E Sanger, Bush Approves
$17.4 Billion Auto Bailout, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 19, 2008), https://www.nytimes
.com/2008/12/19/business/worldbusiness/19iht-20autoB.18826530.html.
32. See WEBEL & LABONTE, supra note 21, at 12.
33. See OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN. FOR THE TROUBLED ASSET RELIEF
PROGRAM, QUARTERLY REPORT TO CONGRESS: OCTOBER 26, 2010, at 51. Only one
firm, AIG, participated in this program. Id.
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Targeted Investment Program. 4 Major auto manufacturers took loan
guarantees and capital totaling $80 billion. 5
The largest TARP programs were aimed at supporting the finan-
cial sector through direct injections of capital, but some of the TARP
funds were used to provide relief to homeowners by subsidizing modi-
fications to certain mortgages to make them easier for consumer bor-
rowers to repay. Making Home Affordable (MHA)36 was designed to
help struggling homeowners by providing incentives for mortgage
servicers to refinance loans and reduce payments to affordable levels
through the Home Affordable Modification Program (HAMP) 7 Ulti-
mately, HAMP modified 1.8 million mortgages before the program
expired in 2016.38
All told, the Treasury operated 13 programs of various sizes
funded by TARP. 39 The unique nature of the Treasury's intervention,
with the federal government investing directly in major private com-
panies, is indicative of the extreme measures that financial regulators
felt were warranted by the financial crisis. Precisely because of this
novel approach, though, the cost of TARP ended up at much less than
its top-line price tag of $700 million. In fact, by most accounts, the net
result of the TARP investments was to turn a profit for the Treasury,
since-as the economy improved-Treasury's investments in many
firms ended up earning positive returns.41
34. Targeted Investment Program, U.S. TREAS. DEP'T, https://www
.treasury.gov/initiatives/financial-stability/TARP-Programs/bank-investment
-programs/tip/Pages/default.aspx (last updated Dec. 9, 2013, 4:43 PM).
35. See Thomas H. Klier & James Rubenstein, Detroit Backfrom
the Brink? Auto Industry Crisis and Restructuring, 2Q FED. RES. BANK CHI.
31, 38 (2012).
36. Housing, U.S. TREAS. DEP'T, https://www.treasury.gov/initiatives
/financial-stability/TARP-Programs/housing/Pages/default.aspx (last updated
Apr. 23, 2019, 10:28 AM).
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. See Richard G. Anderson & Charles S Gascon, A Closer Look:
Assistance Programs in the Wake of the Crisis, REGIONAL ECONOMIST, Jan. 1,
2011, at 6.
40. See id.
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B. Federal Reserve Emergency Lending
One of the early signs of the unfolding crisis was the inability of Bear
Stearns to secure financing in March 2008. With the firm facing the
imminent threat of bankruptcy, the Federal Reserve agreed to provide
twenty-eight days of financing via its emergency lending authority on
March 14, 2008, only to reverse course almost immediately and insist
that Bear Stearns find a fire-sale buyer for its assets in the course of a
weekend.41 On March 16, Bear Stearns signed a merger agreement with
JP Morgan to be acquired for $2 a share, less than seven percent of its
closing price just days prior.42 The Federal Reserve's decision to lend to
Bear Stearns and then insist on a sale reflected the rapidly shifting
approaches taken by regulators as they sought to avoid panic while also
holding firms responsible for their poor investments.
The unusual intervention into Bear Stearns was not the last use
of the Federal Reserve's emergency lending authority. As the crisis
evolved, the Federal Reserve made dramatic and extensive use of its
emergency lending authority to keep credit flowing to areas of the
economy that it deemed critical. During and after the financial crisis,
the Federal Reserve extended credit through more than 21,000 transac-
tions totaling more than $3.3 trillion.43 Companies that received Fed
support were not just Bank of America, Wells Fargo, and other giant
financial institutions, but also more traditional companies. Manufac-
turers such as Caterpillar, Harley Davidson, and General Electric also
were on the receiving end of Fed loans.44 Even foreign firms received
assistance. 45 Ultimately, the lending undertaken by the Federal Reserve
to provide liquidity to firms across the economy dwarfed the TARP
41. See Robert K. Rasmussen & David A. Skeel, Jr., Governmental
Intervention in an Economic Crisis, 19 U. PA. J. Bus. L. 7, 16 (2016).
42. Andrew Ross Sorkin, JP Morgan Pays $2 a Share for Bear
Sterns, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 17, 2008), https://www.nytimes.com/2008/03/17
/business/17bear.html.
43. See John Nichols, Fed's 'Backdoor Bailout'Provided $3.3 Tril-
lion in Loans to Banks, Corporations, NATION (Dec. 2, 2010), https://www
.thenation.com/article/feds-backdoor-bailout-provided-33 -trillion-loans
-banks-corporations/.
44. See id.
45. See id.
[Vo l 23:1
Crisis-Driven Tax Law: The Case of Section 382
program.46 This expansive use of emergency lending authority was
designed to avoid economic catastrophe by ensuring that operating
companies remote from the financial sector, like Verizon and McDon-
alds (two other loan recipients), were not forced into bankruptcy by an
inability to access cash due to the stresses on the financial sector.
The ability of the Federal Reserve to lend to non-banks ema-
nated from section 13(3) of the Federal Reserve Act of 1913,47 an
obscure provision of the law that had not been invoked since the 1930s.
Ordinarily, the Federal Reserve faces significant restrictions on to
whom it may extend credit and on what terms. 48 Under section 13(3),
however, at the time of the financial crisis the Federal Reserve was
permitted to extend credit to "any individual, partnership, or corpora-
tion" provided that a supermajority of the Federal Reserve Board of
Governors determined that "unusual and exigent circumstances apply.' 49
It was this authority that the Federal Reserve invoked to rescue Bear
Stearns.5"
These emergency loans, though technically within the Federal
Reserve's authority, were criticized as being far beyond the scope and
scale envisioned for emergency lending and deemed a "backdoor bail-
out" by critics."1 Ultimately, the Dodd-Frank Act 2 restricted the power
of the Federal Reserve to lend to non-banks, though the restrictions have
been criticized as creating limits on the Federal Reserve's authority that
would ultimately be waived in another crisis.13
46. It should be noted that the Federal Reserve's emergency loans
were, in accordance with its lending rules, fully collateralized. See 12 U.S.C.
§ 343.
47. 38 Stat. 263, as amended; Federal Reserve Act, FED. RESERVE
https://www.federalreserve.gov/aboutthefed/fract.htm (last updated Mar. 10,
2017).
48. See LABONTE, supra note 21, at 8.
49. 12 U.S.C. § 343(A).
50. See id.
51. See id.
52. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection
(Dodd Frank) Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010).
53. See Charles Calomiris et al., Establishing Credible Rules for
Fed Emergency Lending, 9 J. FIN. EcoN. PoL'Y. 260 (2017).
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C. Ad Hoc Interventions
While TARP and the Federal Reserve's use of its emergency lending
authority were large-scale systemic interventions. Other actions taken
by regulators and others during the financial crisis were ad hoc in nature,
aimed at solving problems at specific firms. Many of these actions, like
the Notice, stretched the bounds of precedent and regulatory authority.
This Section reviews some of these cases.
1. The Bear Stearns Merger
In retrospect, the collapse of Bear Stearns in the spring of 2008 was a
striking warning sign of the looming financial crisis. Bear Stearns' col-
lapse was caused by losses in asset-backed securities in an internal hedge
fund, the same types of losses that would doom other banks just months
later. As described above,5 4 Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke
briefly extended financing to Bear Stearns and then orchestrated the
acquisition of the bank by J.P Morgan Chase just days later.55
The Federal Reserve's support of Bear Stearns was within its
power,56 but the structure of the merger agreement was inconsistent
with corporate law as generally understood. Corporate shareholders
generally have the power to accept or reject a merger through a share-
holder vote, but the merger agreement between Bear Stearns and
J.P. Morgan was structured so that J.P. Morgan acquired a 49% stake
in Bear Stearns before the vote took place, effectively rendering
the vote a fait accompli.57 Professors Kahan and Rock note that,
under ordinary circumstances, such an agreement would have been
enjoined as impermissibly overriding shareholders' right to approve the
merger.58 In reality, with markets already roiled, JP Morgan agreed to
increase the purchase price for Bear Stearns stock, from $2 to $10 per
54. See supra Section I.B.
55. See Sorkin, supra note 42.
56. Rasmussen & Skeel, supra note 41.
57. See id. at 16.
58. See Marcel Kahan & Edward B. Rock, How to Prevent Hard
Casesfrom Making Bad Law: Bear Stearns, Delaware, and the Strategic Use
of Comity, 58 EMoRY L. J. 713, 716-21 (2009).
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share,59 but Delaware courts did not intervene in the voting arrange-
ment despite its tension with generally accepted principles of corpo-
rate law.
2. Support for AIG
Insurance giant AIG sat near the epicenter of the financial crisis as it
had written derivatives backing the value of many mortgage-backed
securities.6" As these securities declined in value, AIG was obligated
to pay out on these derivatives and faced capital shortfalls that would
have led to the failure of the firm. Because AIG's counterparties for
these derivatives were other large financial firms that were already in
distress, federal regulators thought it essential to provide financial
support to AIG, and thereby indirectly to their counterparties.
The decision to support AIG came on the heels of the decision
to let Lehman Brothers collapse, and the different approaches to the two
firms demonstrates the rapidly evolving nature of the federal response.
Perhaps in response to the distaste for "bailouts," the Federal Reserve
extended credit to AIG only on draconian terms.61 The Federal Reserve
demanded that AIG issue a 79.9% equity stake to the U.S. government
in exchange for providing access to the Federal Reserve emergency lend-
ing facility. This equity stake was not collateral, but rather would be
forfeit even if the loan were repaid in full.62 The extraction of this con-
cession in exchange for financial support was unique to AIG among the
hundreds of firms that accessed Federal Reserve emergency lending
during the financial crisis.63
The Federal Reserve's unique approach to AIG resulted in
a lawsuit by AIG's largest shareholder, alleging that the extraction
of equity from AIG was an impermissible taking under the Fifth
59. Andrew Ross Sorkin, JPMorgan Raises Bid for Bear Stearns
to $10 a Share, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 24, 2008), https://www.nytimes.com/2008
/03/24/business/24deal-web.html.
60. See Julia Mahoney, Takings, Legitimacy, and Emergency Action:
Lessons from the Financial Crisis, 23 GEO. MASON L. REv. 299, 304 (2016).
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id.
20191
Florida Tax Review
Amendment.64 A decision of the Court of Federal Claims held that,
in fact, while the Federal Reserve had authority under its emergency
lending power to support AIG as it did, it exceeded its authority when it
demanded an equity stake as consideration for the loan, and that the dilu-
tion of AIG shareholders therefore had exceeded the Federal Reserve's
powers.65
3. Chrysler and GM Bankruptcy
Even with respect to funds authorized by the TARP program, there were
controversies about the legal support for financial crisis interventions.
When GM and Chrysler were struggling as a result of the recession that
accompanied the crisis, the Treasury used TARP funds, which had ini-
tially been intended for financial firms, to rescue the automakers.66 As
with Federal Reserve emergency lending, there was sufficient flexibil-
ity in the statutory framework to permit this use of funds, but the
expansion of the use of TARP was nevertheless controversial.67
The actual structure of the rescue was more legally problem-
atic. In a packaged transaction, the Treasury Department had GM and
Chrysler declare bankruptcy and sell their assets to a new entity under
rules which essentially ensured that the government-favored bidder
would win the auction. The new entities guaranteed some of the auto-
makers' pension obligations and promised to repay significant unsecured
trade debt. Under the rules of the auction, any other bidder would have
to agree to do the same.68 This was particularly problematic in the case
of Chrysler, whose debtors were forced to take losses that might have
been mitigated had another bidder been able to enter a competitive bid.
These examples capture only a portion of the extraordinary
interventions undertaken during the financial crisis, focusing on actions
64. Starr Int'l Co. v. Fed. Reserve Bank of N.Y., 742 F.3d 37 (2d
Cir. 2014).
65. Starr Int'l Co. v. United States, 121 Fed. C1. 428 (Fed. C1. 2015),
vacated in part, aff'd in part, & remanded by 856 F.3d 953 (Fed. Cir. 2017).
66. See Rasmussen & Skeel, supra note 41, at 16 (2016); Herszen-
horn & Sanger, supra note 31.
67. Herszenhorn & Sanger, supra note 31.
68. See id.
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taken by Congress, the Treasury Department, and the Federal Reserve
Bank. While the legality and propriety of these actions have been crit-
icized, the regulators and policy makers who advocated these interven-
tions clearly saw them as essential to staving off significant economic
damage. What would have happened had the government not intervened
is a counterfactual that remains a subject of debate. The balance of this
Article turns to an action taken by the IRS that has received far less
attention than those described above but that is instructive in its own
way about making law in a time of crisis.
II. A TAX RESPONSE TO THE FINANCIAL CRISIS
This Part reviews the background of Code section 382 and the adoption
of IRS Notice 2008-83 and its aftermath. We present a timeline of
events from the adoption of the Notice through the ensuing controversy
to its eventual repeal. This timeline highlights the controversy around
the Notice.
A. Section 382 of the Internal Revenue Code
U.S. federal income tax law includes a variety of statutory, regulatory,
and doctrinal tools, discouraging taxpayers from undertaking transac-
tions that are motivated by tax avoidance. Some of the tools are broad
standards, such as the requirement that a transaction have "economic
substance" to be respected,69 while others are detailed rules that go to
great lengths to anticipate the variety of ways that taxpayers might try
to circumvent the intent of the rule. Code section 382 is an example of
the latter type.7" Section 382 was first added to Code in 1954, but was
subsequently revised, most significantly in 1986. At a high level, Code
section 382 restricts the rate at which a corporation can use certain tax
assets to offset taxable income following a significant change in equity
ownership of the corporation. Whereas a corporation that has not trig-
gered an ownership change can generally "carry forward" its net oper-
ating losses from prior years to offset taxable income in subsequent years
69. See I.R.C. § 7701(o).
70. The objective approach adopted by Code section 382 is sharply
contrasted with the intent-based test in Code section 269. For a summary of
the history, see Samuel Dimon, Limit My Practice Instead! Thoughts on
Reforming Section 382, TAXES MAG., Mar. 2010, at 88.
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without limitation, a corporation that has triggered an ownership change
can only use a small portion of those losses each year. This portion is
generally equal to the amount of equity in the corporation before the
ownership change multiplied by a fraction of the Federal government's
long-term borrowing rate.
The fundamental tension between the expectation that taxpay-
ers will respond to taxes and the desire that they should not respond too
much is reflected in the complex motivations behind Code section 382
and related doctrines.71 Those motivations are multiple: discouraging
"loss trafficking,"7 2 preventing windfalls to new owners of loss corpo-
rations by enabling them to receive higher after-tax rates of return on
account of losses that accrued before they were owners, preventing a
corporation from offsetting the income from one business line with the
losses from another line, limiting the incentive to continue loss corpo-
rations solely for the sake of using their tax assets, and preventing the
distortion of business transactions that should ideally be based solely
on pre-tax economic returns.7 3 The 1986 amendments to Code sec-
tion 382 drew heavily on Senate Finance Committee recommenda-
tions74 that reflected a new emphasis on this last motivation and an
overriding concern with "tax neutrality," that is, preventing tax consid-
erations from distorting economic decisions.75
71. The evolution of laws aimed at "loss trafficking" has tended to
also reflect ambiguity about whether net operating losses should be tied to the
corporation, or its shareholders, or a business line. See, e.g., Libson Shops,
Inc. v. Koehler, 353 U.S. 382 (1957).
72. FEDERAL INCOME, ESTATE AND GIFT TAX PROJECT: INCOME TAX
PROBLEMS OF CORPORATIONS AND SHAREHOLDERS, pt. 5, at 341 (AM. LAW INST.
1958) (noting that the transferability of tax losses "does appear to many as
partaking of tax immorality").
73. Dimon, supra note 70, at 92.
74. Id. at 93.
75. Those recommendations were supported by the testimony of
Assistant Secretary of the Treasury (Tax Policy) Ronald Pearlman, which was
submitted to the Senate Finance Subcommittee on Taxation and Debt Man-
agement. Id. The desire to achieve neutrality animated the adoption of Code
section 382. See Daniel L. Simmons, Net Operating Losses and Section 382:
Searching for a Limitation on Loss Carryovers, 63 TUL. L. REV. 1045, 1045
(1988) ("Congress recently adopted tax neutrality as its goal for structuring
a limitation on net operating loss carryovers."). In this context, "neutrality
is achieved if the existence of a net operating loss carryover is neither an
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If it were not for Code section 382, corporations with large
amounts of built-in losses and net operating loss carryforwards would
be attractive vehicles for sheltering income from other sources. Such
corporations would also be capable of providing a higher after-tax rate
of return on an investment than would be available without those losses,
because the tax losses could be deducted from the investment's income
thereby shielding it from tax. For these reasons, a profitable corpora-
tion might seek out a merger with a loss corporation to shelter its own
active income, or it might acquire the loss corporation solely to hold pas-
sive investment assets. All else equal, a corporation with built-in losses
is a more attractive merger target than one without such tax assets and
will also be able to attract capital at a lower cost, because it can offer a
higher after-tax rate of return to investors. Moreover, because these tax
inducement nor an impediment to a business transaction, so that business
combinations will be based upon economic factors separate from tax consid-
erations related to the value of loss carryovers. This neutrality requires that
the value of a net operating loss carryover to the purchaser be limited to the
value of the carryover to the selling loss corporation." Id. at 1070 (footnote
omitted). Some scholars have asked whether the neutrality concerns about
NOLs distorting behavior are more theoretical than real. See, e.g., Michael L.
Schultz, Section 382 and the Pursuit of Neutrality in the Treatment of Net
Operating Loss Carryovers, 39 U. KAN. L. REV. 59 (1990). For a critical eval-
uation of limitations on NOL carryovers predating new Code section 382, see
J. Clifton Fleming, Jr., Reflections on Section 382: Searchingfor a Rationale,
1979 BYU L. REv. 213, 223 ("The only compelling argument against free
trade in corporate NOL carryovers is one of practical politics."). As is often
the case, the effects of Code section 382 have often been exaggerated. "Indeed,
new section 382 was enacted over warnings from a leading contributor to
the NOL carryover debate that adoption of rules similar to those ultimately
reflected in the statute 'would be like throwing a hand grenade into a village
and killing innocent civilians."' Richard L. Parker, The Innocent Civilians in
the War Against NOL Trafficking: Section 382 and High-Tech Start- Up Com-
panies, 9 VA. TAx REv. 625, 626 (1989) (quoting Staff Recommendations to
Revise Subchapter C: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Taxation & Debt Man-
agement of the S. Comm. on Finance, 99th Cong. 391 (1985) (statement of Rich-
ard L. Bacon)). Professor Parker himself asserted that "[h]igh-tech, start-up
companies are, in this way, the innocent civilians in the war being waged against
those who would otherwise traffick in NOL carryovers." Id. at 708. In fact, neu-
trality, in the sense of aiming for taxes to have as small an effect as possible on
consumption and investment decisions is generally accepted to be one of the
overarching goals of tax law and policy.
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assets are more valuable in the hands of an acquirer with more income
to shelter, a profitable acquirer should be willing to pay more than
another potential acquirer for a loss corporation even if the profitable
acquirer cannot operate the assets of the loss corporation as efficiently.
The emphasis in discouraging tax-related distortions, wherever
they might arise, explains (even if it doesn't justify) the broad applica-
bility of Code section 382 and the wide set of circumstances in which it
can be triggered. At its simplest, the Code section 382 limitation is trig-
gered when the aggregate percentage of the stock in the corporation
owned by shareholders who own five percent of the corporation increases
by more than 50 percentage points between any two dates in a three-
year window. Thus, the sale by a corporate parent of 51% of the stock
of a subsidiary will trigger the limitation. But the limitation will also
apply to a corporation that is owned 51% by one parent and 49% by
another parent, if the first parent sells all its stock to the public in a reg-
istered stock offering.76 Indeed, Code section 382 applies in a variety of
circumstances where it is unlikely that tax is a driving concern even if,
in theory, the benefits of the tax losses could cause the loss corporation's
assets to be owned by acquirers solely because of their greater tax capac-
ity or otherwise lead to a misallocation of new capital.
B. Notice 2008-83 and Its Aftermath
On September 30, 2008, the IRS issued Notice 2008-83.7 The Notice
provided that:
For purposes of section 382(h), any deduction properly
allowed after an ownership change (as defined in sec-
tion 382(g)) to a bank with respect to losses on loans
or bad debts (including any deduction for a reasonable
addition to a reserve for bad debts) shall not be treated
as a built-in loss or a deduction that is attributable to
periods before the change date.78
76. The stock will be treated as purchased by a single "public
group," the ownership of which will be aggregated for purposes of classifying
that group as a 5-percent shareholder. See generally the segregation rules of
Treas. Reg. §§ 1.382-1T to -2T.
77. See Notice 2008-83, 2008-2 C.B. 905.
78. Id.
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The effect of the Notice was to exclude unrealized losses on
loans from the Code section 382 limitation. For large banks, losses on
loans are realized for tax purposes (and hence deductible) when the debt
becomes worthless or is recoverable only in part.79 The determination
of when these events have occurred is generally a facts and circum-
stances determination taking into account the circumstances of the
debtor and the value of any collateral.8" However, there is a presumption
that a debt that is charged off for accounting and regulatory purposes
will be deemed worthless. Following the Notice, this presumption gave
banks a reason to delay the realization of losses on their loan portfo-
lios. By deciding not to discharge a delinquent loan for accounting
purposes, a bank could influence whether that bad debt remained unre-
alized for tax purposes. As long as the loan loss was not realized, it
would be outside the scope of Code section 382.
The treatment of unrealized losses by the Notice was viewed
as a strained interpretation of the statute by some, and an unauthorized
statutory override by others.81 The Notice also had significant benefits
for certain banks. For example, the Notice was seen as directly responsi-
ble for the ability of Wells Fargo to make an 1 th-hour bid for Wacho-
via in excess of the price offered by Citibank. Wells Fargo stated at the
time that it expected to use $74 billion in tax losses on the Wachovia
loan portfolio.8 2 The perception that the Treasury Department was inter-
vening in the market and picking winners and losers through selective
79. I.R.C. § 166(a)(1), (a)(2).
80. Treas. Reg. § 1.166-2(a).
81. Professor Zelenak has argued that the Notice was an intervention
of great economic significance. Zelenak, supra note 9, at 846. He asserts that
"[t]he primary purpose of the notice appears to have been the facilitation of the
acquisition of failing Wachovia-by Wells Fargo, as it turned out. Although the
notice generated considerable outrage in the media, among tax experts, and on
Capitol Hill, it achieved the desired result." Id. (footnote omitted). He goes on to
say that, "The recent § 382 notices should be troubling to anyone who values the
application of the rule of law to tax administration." Id. at 847.
82. Jesse Drucker, Obscure Tax Breaks Increase Cost of Financial
Rescue, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 18, 2008, 12:01 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles
/SB122428410507346351. The whole episode raises doubts about the legiti-
macy of the IRS. See Abreu & Greenstein, supra note 9, at 511 ("Now consider
an alternative narrative, one in which instead of purporting to be 'studying'
the interpretation of section 382, the IRS felt free to acknowledge what many,
including us, believe it was doing: exercising enforcement authority to suspend
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application of the tax law caused some scholars to argue that the guid-
ance was an unreasonable interpretation of the law and an invalid
exercise of the Treasury's regulatory authority83 and to argue that tax-
payers should have standing to challenge IRS actions that favor their
competitors.84 Others, including some prominent law firms, argued that
the Notice was merely an interpretation of existing law and designed to
provide guidance about the thorny question of how to identify and mea-
sure built-in losses on distressed debt.85
Banks were entitled to rely on the Notice until subsequent guid-
ance was issued.86 The IRS did not issue any subsequent guidance, but
the interpretation of Code section 382 provided in the Notice was over-
ruled by the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009.87 As a
result, the Notice was effective only for transactions that were signed
on or before January 16, 2009.88 Although the Notice was only overruled
the application of section 382 because exigent circumstances-the threat of
wholesale economic collapse-required it.").
83. See, e.g., Cushman, supra note 8.
84. See, e.g., Sunil Shenoi, Note, Undoing Undue Favors: Providing
Competitors with Standing to Challenge Favorable IRS Actions, 43 U. MICH.
J.L. REFORM 531 (2010).
85. See, e.g., Insights: Revisiting Notice 2008-83, JONES DAY
(Dec. 2008), https://www.jonesday.com/en/insights/2008/12/revisiting-notice
-2008-83.
86. The term "bank" is defined in Code section 581. It reads:
For purposes of sections 582 and 584, the term 'bank' means
a bank or trust company incorporated and doing business
under the laws of the United States (including laws relating
to the District of Columbia) or of any State, a substantial
part of the business of which consists of receiving deposits
and making loans and discounts, or of exercising fiduciary
powers similar to those permitted to national banks under
authority of the Comptroller of the Currency, and which is
subject by law to supervision and examination by State, Ter-
ritorial, or Federal authority having supervision over bank-
ing institutions. Such term also means a domestic building
and loan association.
87. Pub. L. No. 111-5, 123 Stat. 115 (2009).
88. Despite its repeal, some argue that Congress supported the
Notice. See, e.g., Matthew Cline, Comment, The Economics and Politics of
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in early 2009, expressions of concern began to appear much earlier. In
October 2008, Senator Schumer wrote a letter to Secretary Paulson and
IRS Commissioner Shulman expressing concern that the Notice, "which
was never debated by Congress," could cost tens of billions of dollars
in foregone tax revenue and lead to excessive consolidation of the finan-
cial industry.8 9 On November 14, Senator Grassley requested that the
Office of the Inspector General of the Treasury conduct an investiga-
tion of the circumstances of the issuance of Notice 2008-83, particu-
larly as it pertained to the acquisition of Wachovia by Wells Fargo.9 Five
days later, Senator Sanders introduced a bill, which never passed, to
rescind the Notice.91 On January 26, 2009, H.R. 1, which would subse-
quently become the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act, was
introduced in the House of Representatives with language overturning
Notice 2008-83. The following is a timeline of events between the issu-
ance of the Notice and its repeal:92
Tax Loss Carryforwards in the Great Recession: Why GM Gets a $16 Billion
Subsidy, 65 TAX LAW. 399 (2012). The Notice was effective as to ownership
changes pursuant to contracts signed on or before 1/16/2009 or for which
there was a written agreement and either a public announcement or SEC filing
on or before that date.
89. Press Release, Sen. Charles E. Schumer, Schumer Seeks
Answers from IRS, Treasury on Tax Code Change That Subsidizes Bank
Acquisitions (Oct. 30, 2008).
90. See Grassley Seeks Inspector General Review, supra note 13.
91. S. 3692, 110th Cong. (2008).
92. During this eventful period, the IRS issued other notices that
affected the application of Code section 382. See Notice 2008-101, 2008-44
I.R.B. 1082 (issued Nov. 3, 2008) (providing that TARP funds are not taxable
income to the recipients); Notice 2008-100, 2008-2 C.B. 1081 (issued Nov. 3,
2008) (disregarding stock or warrants acquired by the U.S. government for
purposes of triggering application of Code section 382); Notice 2008-91,
2008-43 I.R.B. 1001 (issued Oct. 27, 2008) (loosening short-term lending
rules under Code section 956 to facilitate subsidiary financing to U.S. parents);
Notice 2008-84, 2008-41 I.R.B. 855 (issued Oct. 14, 2008) (providing that so
long as the United States or one of its agencies or instrumentalities owns more
than 50% of the stock in a corporation no date with constitute a testing date for
determining an ownership change); Notice 2008-78, 2008-41 I.R.B. 851
(issued Oct. 14, 2008) (loosening the anti-stuffing rules of 382(l)(1)); Notice
2008-76, 2008-39 I.R.B. 768 (issued Sept. 29, 2008) (preventing application of
382 resulting from acquisition by U.S. government of stock of Fannie Mae and
Freddie Mac).
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Timeline of Events Around Notice 2008-83
Event
Sept. 30, 2008
Early Oct., 2008
Mid Oct., 2008
Oct. 30, 2008
Nov. 14, 2008
Nov. 19, 2008
Jan. 26, 2009
Jan. 27, 2009
Feb. 12, 2009
Feb. 17, 2009
IRS Releases Notice 2008-83.
Law firms begin publishing guidance on the
Notice.93
Articles appear in popular press.
Sen. Schumer sends letter to Secretary Paulson
and Commissioner Doug Shulman.
Sen. Grassley asks Treasury IG to review Notice.
Sen. Sanders introduces bill to rescind Notice.
(The bill goes nowhere.)
H.R. 1, which would become the American
Recovery and Reinvestment Act, introduced in the
House with language to overturn Notice.
H. Rep. 111-8 states, "legal authority to prescribe
Internal Revenue Service Notice 2008-83 is
doubtful."
Conference Report to Accompany H.R. 1 is
published. It repeats the language used in
H. Rep 111-8, at 555-560, 111th Cong. (2009).
American Recovery and Reinvestment Act
(Pub. L. No. 111-5) signed into law, which overturns
Notice 2008-83.
It is important to understand how the events leading up to and
following the Notice evolved, because it was clear only a month after
the Notice was issued that the tax benefits it provided might not last
indefinitely and that putting off a transaction that would trigger the Code
section 382 limitation risked subjecting large unrealized losses on loan
93. See, e.g., Notice 2008-83: The IRS Offers Reassurance to
Troubled Banks, MORRISON FOERSTER (Oct. 2, 2008), https://www.mofo.com
/resources/publications/notice-2008 -83 -the-irs-offers-reassurance-to -trou
bled-banks.html.
Date
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portfolios to Code section 382. In the next Part, we provide a numerical
example that illustrates the effects of Code section 382 on merger activ-
ity and, by implication, the effects that the Notice would be expected to
have by curtailing Code section 382.
III. THE EFFECTS OF SECTION 382: ECONOMIC THEORY
AND AN EXAMPLE
In this Part, we provide a simple numerical example that demonstrates
the effect of Code section 382 on corporations' incentives and decision
to merge. The example also generates predictions that guide our empir-
ical analysis in Part IV. In the Appendix, we present a more generalized
analytical model that substantially expands the analysis in the numerical
example. The example is based on two hypothetical firms: one target
firm that has amassed net operating or "built-in losses" on property that
it owns (which, together, we call "NOLs"), and one acquiring (or buyer)
firm, with no NOLs of its own. In case the firms merge, they may or
may not be able to generate additional profits, which we refer to as syn-
ergies, as a unitary entity. The example focuses on two possible legal
regimes. In the first regime, the combined firm that results from the
merger is free to use any or all the target corporation's NOLs to reduce
its taxable income (No 382 Limitation Regime). In the second regime,
the amount of the target's NOLs that the combined firm can use is lim-
ited based on the target's earnings potential (382 Limitation Regime).
This approximates the situation when Code section 382 is in effect.
Although the numerical example is simple, it will demonstrate
several important results. First, in the No 382 Limitation Regime, the
companies will have a strong incentive to merge to take advantage of
the NOLs, and the combination will take place even when there is no (or
even negative) synergy. The regime can lead to inefficient mergers. Sec-
ond, in the 382 Limitation Regime, the opposite happens: because the
combined firm is restricted in its ability to use the target's NOLs, the
amount of synergy must be quite large for the merger to make sense.
That is, even with a positive synergy, the firms may decide not to
merge even though this may be efficient. As we move from 382 Limita-
tion Regime to No 382 Limitation Regime-which was the effect of
the Notice-more mergers are likely to take place and, at least on aver-
age, the mergers that do take place will exhibit lower (or even negative)
synergy. That is, the mergers that take place under the No 382 Limita-
tion Regime are likely to perform worse than those under the 382 Lim-
itation Regime.
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A. The Basic Setup
Consider a target corporation that has accumulated NOLs in the amount
of $1,000. The target firm's prospects going forward are poor. In the
future, the firm expects to generate (in present value terms) a pre-tax
profit of $600. To make our calculation easy, suppose the corporate
income tax rate is 50%. If the target corporation were to stay indepen-
dent and generate a pre-tax profit of $600 in the future, given that the
firm can utilize all of its NOLs, the firm will have a taxable income of $0
(because $600 of the target's losses will be deducted against its $600 of
income). The firm will be able to capture its entire $600 of profits, imply-
ing that its stand-alone value will be $600. Unfortunately, however, the
target's pre-tax profit is too small, by $400, to use all of its NOLs.
Now suppose that there is a potential buyer for the target cor-
poration. Unlike the target corporation, the buyer has been profitable and
has no NOLs. Going forward, the buyer corporation expects to realize
a profit of $800. Assume, for the sake of simplicity, that the buyer is also
subject to a tax rate of 50% so that the after-tax income of the buyer is
$400 and, therefore, the buyer corporation's stand-alone value is $400.
Even though the buyer generates more pre-tax profit than the target, the
target corporation is worth more than the buyer corporation because of
the target's NOLs. The Table below summarizes the stand-alone values
for the respective companies.
Accumulated
Net-Operating Future Future
and Built-In Pre-Tax After-Tax Income
Losses (NOLs) Income (50% tax rate)
Target Corporation $1,000 $600 $600
Buyer Corporation $0 $800 $400
B. No Section 382 Limitation Regime
Suppose that there is no limitation on how much of the target's NOLs
the combined company can use to reduce its taxable income. In our
example, given that the target corporation has NOLs of $1,000, while
the buyer corporation has no NOLs, if the buyer corporation were to
acquire the target corporation, the combined company can use up to
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$1,000 of the NOLs to reduce its taxable income. Also, to make the
example interesting, suppose that not only is there no synergy from this
combination, but instead the merger will reduce the combined com-
pany's pre-tax profit by $200. That is, if the target and the buyer were
to stay independent, the sum of their pre-tax profits is $1,400, but if
they were to merge, then they would have a combined pre-tax profit of
$1,200. Because this merger is destroying value, this merger is ineffi-
cient and should not take place.
Nevertheless, the target and the buyer will decide to merge, and
the reason is the NOLs. To see why, recall that if the two companies were
to stay independent then they would generate a total after-tax income
of $1,000. Now, consider what happens if they were to merge. If they
combine their operations, their pre-tax income, after accounting for the
$200 destruction of value, becomes $1,200, but because the combined
company can fully utilize the target's $1,000 of NOLs, its taxable income
will be only $200. With a 50% income tax rate, the combined company
only has to pay $100 in taxes, and its after-tax income becomes $1,100
($1,200 in profits less $100 in taxes). This is greater than $1,000, which
is the aggregate after-tax income of the two firms if they were to stay
independent. The fact that the combined company will generate a higher
after-tax income will produce a strong incentive for them to merge, even
though the merger destroys value. The Table below summarizes this
incentive.
Aggregate Aggregate
Pre-Tax Income Post-Tax Income
Buyer and Target Stay Independent $1,400 $1,000
Buyer and Target Merge $1,200 $1,100
This portion of the example has shown that allowing merged
companies to use the NOLs of the target and the buyer without limita-
tions will lead to a "distortion"; the presence of NOLs will encourage
firms to combine even if the merger would generate no (or even nega-
tive) economic value. The intuition for this result is clear. If the target
stays independent, a lot of valuable NOLs ($400 worth) are lost because
the target does not generate enough profit to use them. This implies that
the merger will generate more after-tax income as long as the combined
company destroys no more than $400 of value.
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C. Section 382 Limitation Regime
Given that allowing the combined company to fully use the target's
accumulated NOLs will lead to a distortion, what if we were to limit
the amount of NOL use? It turns out that prohibiting the combined
company from using accumulated NOLs will create the opposite prob-
lem: it will discourage companies from merging even when it creates
value. To see this, suppose that an independent target company is free
to use all of its accumulated NOLs, but if the target company were to
be acquired by the buyer, the combined company could use only a por-
tion of the target's NOLs. Let's assume that the combined company
can use only $300 (out of $1,000) of the target's NOLs.94 At the same
time, in contrast to the previous example, suppose the combined com-
pany will generate an additional $200 of synergistic profits. That is,
the aggregate pre-tax income of the companies is $1,400 if they stay
independent, but the merged company will generate $1,600 of pre-tax
income.
Will the $200 of merger synergy be sufficient for the compa-
nies to combine? With the limitation on NOLs, the answer is no. If the
companies merge, they will generate $1,600 of pre-tax income. At the
same time, due to the section 382 limitation, they can use only $300 of
the target's $1,000 of NOLs. This implies that, with the assumed 50%
income tax rate, the merged company will have to pay $650 in taxes
(this is 50% of $1,600 - $300) and the merged company's after-tax
income will be only $950. Since the aggregate after-tax income of the
two independent companies was $1,000, the merger is no longer attrac-
tive for the companies on an after-tax basis. The results are summarized
in the Table below.
94. The section 382 limitation rules are complex, and we are using
the $300 limitation as a simplification. As discussed earlier, the section 382
limitation depends on the amount of equity in the (target) corporation before
the ownership change (e.g., merger). We can roughly equate this with the tar-
get corporation's earnings potential (of $600). If we were to assume that the
combined company can use only 50% of the target's earnings as NOLs, this
produces $300 (- (0.5) x $600). NOLs that are not used are carried forward
indefinitely, but can only reduce taxable income by 80% in any one year.
I.R.C. § 172.
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Aggregate Aggregate
Pre-Tax Income Post-Tax Income
Buyer and Target Stay Independent $1,400 $1,000
Buyer and Target Merge $1,600 $950
This example demonstrates that constraining the use of NOLs
creates the opposite problem of that created by placing no limitation on
NOL use. With NOL limitations, some value-creating mergers will not
take place because of the limitation on how much the combined com-
pany can reduce its tax burden. In the example, when the target stayed
independent, it was able to use $600 of NOLs to reduce its taxable
income. When the companies merged, however, the amount of NOLs
the combined company could use went down to $300. The $200 increase
in pre-tax profits from the merger is insufficient to overcome the loss of
$300 in after-tax income. In the Appendix we show, using a more gen-
eral model, that these results are quite robust: the outcome does not
depend on the numerical values.
D. Comparison
The numerical example generates at least a few interesting empirical
predictions that are relevant for our analysis of Notice 2008-83 as
well as about Code section 382 limitations more generally. Foremost,
as we moved from 382 Limitation Regime to No 382 Limitation
Regime-as was done (at least in part) by IRS Notice 2008-83-we
should observe a few things. First, given that the companies have a
stronger incentive to merge under No 382 Limitation Regime, more
mergers are likely to take place under No 382 Limitation Regime than
under 382 Limitation Regime. This is because, under No 382 Limita-
tion Regime, the parties may want to execute the merger largely for
the purpose of being able to utilize the target company's NOLs. Fur-
thermore, when we move from 382 Limitation Regime to No 382
Limitation Regime, the mergers that do take place will exhibit lower
(or even negative) post-merger performance. That is, the mergers that
take place under the No 382 Limitation Regime are likely to perform
worse than those under the 382 Limitation Regime. We test these
hypotheses in Part IV.
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IV. EMPIRICALLY MEASURING THE EFFECTS OF THE NOTICE
We combine several data sources to empirically evaluate the effect of
Code section 382 on merger activity. Data on bank and bank holding
company mergers was collected from the Federal Reserve Bank of Chi-
cago and combined with stock return data from the Center for Research
in Security Prices (CRSP).95 Each bank and bank holding company is
assigned a unique identifier known as its RSSD ID.96 The merger data
include identifiers for both the target and surviving entities for the merger
as well as the top company in each bank's corporate structure. We
retained this information because often it is the bank holding company,
and not the bank itself, that is publicly listed.
Additional bank data were collected from regulatory filings
known as Call Reports, available on the Federal Financial Institutions
Examination Council website.97 Call Reports, which contain detailed
financial disclosures for banks, are filed quarterly, and we compiled a
panel dataset of these reports from 2004-2014, a symmetric window
around the issuance of the Notice.98 A similar panel dataset was con-
structed from regulatory filings for bank holding companies on file with
the Chicago Federal Reserve Bank.99 If multiple reports were filed on
behalf of the bank holding company, we used the figures for the consoli-
dated group. For small bank holding companies that do not file consoli-
dated financials, we imputed the data from all majority-held subsidiaries
directly to the small bank holding company. For both banks and bank
holding companies, we selected a subset of the available variables,
95. The Chicago Fed provides a linking table that connects bank
identifiers to the CRSP data files. See Commercial Bank Data, FED. RES. BANK
CHI., https ://www.chicagofed.org/banking/financial-institution-reports/com
mercial-bank-data (last visited Oct. 12, 2019); see also Data Access Tools, CTR.
FOR RES. SEC. PRICES, http://www.crsp.com/products/software-access-tools (last
visited Oct. 12, 2019).
96. See Definitions of Banking Terms, NAT'L INFO. CTR., https://
www.ffiec.gov/nicpubweb/Content/HELP/DefinitionsOfBankingTerms.htm
(last visited Oct. 12, 2019).
97. https://cdr.ffiec.gov/public/ (last visited Oct. 12, 2019).
98. For firms missing a June 30, 2008, Call Report, we use the prior
Call Report.
99. See Holding Company Data, FED. RES. BANK CHI., https://www
.chicagofed.org/banking/financial-institution-reports/bhc-data (last visited
Oct. 12, 2019).
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focusing on those related to the tax position of the bank and the strength
of its loan portfolio. These include the amount of chargeoffs and loan loss
reserves, as well as the amount of loans that are nonperforming (i.e., at
least 90 days past due and still accruing interest, or not accruing interest).
We restrict the data sample to exclude acquisitions where the
acquirer was another bank with the same parent as the target bank, since
these do not represent arm's-length acquisitions. Because the definition of
a bank for regulatory purposes does not perfectly overlap with the defini-
tion of a bank for tax purposes, we include in our analysis only entities
that, based on their description, we believe are engaged in taking depos-
its and lending, the touchstone of banking for tax purposes: bank holding
companies, member and non-member banks of the Federal Reserve Sys-
tem, Savings and Loan Associations, State Member Banks, and certain
other domestic entities that engage in banking activities in the U.S.
This Part lays out our empirical tests of the effect of the Notice.
We begin by discussing issues with identifying mergers affected by the
Notice and then turn to tests of merger activity, post-merger perfor-
mance, and changes to the market capitalization of banks.
A. Identification
There were a variety of tax and non-tax interventions in the financial
sector during the crisis, including a series of notices related to the appli-
cation of Code section 382 to unprecedented actions by the U.S. Trea-
sury and Federal Reserve in taking ownership stakes in banks. Notice
2008-83 was the first such notice. News articles and memos from law
firms at the time indicate the unexpected nature of this guidance.1"'
The fact that the Notice was widely panned as an improper exercise of
Treasury's authority and repealed three months later may also be viewed
as evidence that the Notice was unexpected. Although the Notice applied
retroactively to ownership changes that had already occurred, we think
it is reasonable to assume that any merger signed before September
30th was not negotiated in anticipation of the Notice.
However, by November 19, when Senator Sanders introduced a
bill to rescind the Notice, parties to a potential bank merger should have
been aware that the favorable treatment of unrealized loan losses pro-
vided by the Notice would not last. Although the ultimate resolution of
100. See, e.g., Notice 2008-83: The IRS Offers Reassurance, supra
note 93.
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how unrealized loan losses would be treated under Code section 382 and
which (if any) transactions the Notice would apply to could not be known
with certainty, the possibility that the Notice would only apply to merg-
ers signed or closed by a certain date should have provided merger par-
ties with an incentive to accelerate negotiations and consummate the
transactions as quickly as possible. Because of the uncertainty about
when the Notice would be overruled, some mergers that closed in
January 2009 may have been finalized with the mistaken belief that the
target would be subject to the Notice.
Cleanly identifying the mergers that were subject to the Notice
is made more difficult by the fact that the merger date provided by the
Chicago Fed is the closing date, while the American Recovery and Rein-
vestment Act generally limited the Notice to contracts that had been
signed by January 16, 2009.11 This difference introduces measurement
errors at both the beginning and end of the Notice window; some merg-
ers that were negotiated before the Notice was issued may not have
closed until after September 30th, and some mergers that signed before
January 16th did not close until after that date. Although there is anec-
dotal evidence that bank mergers were consummated very quickly
during this time, there is almost certainly some measurement error in
how we identify which mergers were subject to the Notice. Practically,
what this means is that we are missing from some of our empirical tests
mergers that signed in the Notice window but did not close until after it
ended and that we have included in our sample of Notice mergers some
that were negotiated before the window. This latter group of mergers
will tend to attenuate any effects that we observe. The mergers that
were signed during the Notice window but closed after it could bias our
empirical estimates if the mergers that took longer to close differ in
relevant ways from the mergers that signed and closed in the Notice win-
dow. The increased merger activity we observe during the Notice win-
dow does not appear to extend past the end of January (see Figure 1),
suggesting that any effect of such mergers on our estimates is small.
B. M&A Activity During the Notice Period
Figure 1 shows the number of bank and bank holding company merg-
ers and acquisitions by month around the date of the Notice. The shaded
101. American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Pub. L.
No. 111-5, 123 Stat. 115 (2009).
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bars indicate the four-month period from October 2008 to January 2009.
The chart shows a general decline in the number of mergers before the
Notice period, but with considerable variability and some apparent cycli-
cality, with more mergers closing late in the calendar year. Neverthe-
less, there is a visible increase in the number of mergers in the last three
months of 2008 and the first month of 2009. This period corresponds
with the peak of the financial crisis, so it is difficult to draw causal
conclusions about the Notice, particularly as banks tend to consolidate
during times of financial distress. Statistical regression estimates in
Table 5 suggest that the increase in merger activity during the notice
period is statistically marginal, once we control for year and quarterly
cyclicality. Nevertheless, the increase in merger activity is consistent
with the prediction of the model that lifting the NOL restriction would
lead to an increased number of mergers.
How do the mergers that took place within the Notice win-
dow differ from mergers that took place before September 30th?
Table 3 presents summary statistics as of June 30, 2008, for all banks,
as well as univariate tests of the characteristics of bank merger tar-
gets for mergers consummated before and during the Notice period.1 2
This gives a sense of how target banks differed from other banks,
as well as how mergers during the Notice period differed from merg-
ers before the Notice period. We look at how target banks charged
off and added to reserves for bad loans for accounting purposes. We
also include a collection of variables that predict bank failures and
acquisitions.10 3
Although the sample size is relatively small, we see no signifi-
cant differences between window and non-window mergers, with the
exception that pre-Notice mergers were larger than mergers during the
Notice period, but even this difference is not robust to alternative mea-
sures of size. We see no other significant differences in target bank char-
acteristics during the merger period.
To get more insight into whether the characteristics of bank
mergers differed during the Notice period, we present estimates from a
series of statistical regressions that explore the determinants of becoming
102. We use t-tests for the differences in means between the two
groups of mergers.
103. By comparing data for all of the banks on June 30, 2008, we
avoid picking up time trends, which were certainly negative during this period.
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a merger target in Table 414 In the first regression model (in column 1),
we include only the control variables and find sensible results. Banks
with less liquidity (cash and cash-equivalent assets) and banks with
lower capital adequacy are more likely to be merger targets. In model
2, we add a variable that is equal to one if the merger was in the Notice
window and find no effect of the Notice on merger probability. In model
3, we interact the Notice window variable with the amount of bad loans
reported in the Call Report. This "bad loans" variable corresponds
most closely with the unrealized losses potentially made available to an
acquirer by the Notice. We find no increased effect of bad loans on
being a merger target during the Notice period. Fully interacting the
control variables with the Notice variable in model 4, we find that none
of the interaction terms are significant. We interpret this as showing
that the determinants of mergers during the Notice window do not dif-
fer measurably from the determinants in other time periods, suggesting
that tax losses did not become a more important driver of mergers
when the Notice was in effect.
Table 5 presents a parallel set of regression results where the
dependent variable is the number of acquisitions undertaken by a
bank during the period covered by each Call Report. The variables
again show intuitive results; banks with stronger financial circum-
stances are more likely to acquire other banks, but we see no differ-
ential effect on firms' acquisition activity during the Notice period
when we interact the Notice variable with the other variables in models
3 and 4.
Together, Tables 4 and 5 suggest that the effect of the Notice on
merger activity was relatively weak. The variable for the effect of the
Notice is statistically significant in only one of the models, and none of
the variables interacted with the Notice is significant in either regres-
sion. A caveat in interpreting these results is that, although the panel of
observations is large, the number of Notice-period mergers is relatively
small, limiting our ability to detect small differences during the period.
It is possible that the Notice had effects that are beyond the power of
our tests to detect.
104. These are pooled panel logit regressions with covariates drawn
from the literature on bank mergers. Because our data includes a number of
extreme outliers, we Winsorize our data at the 99% level. All models include
quarter and year dummies to control for time trend and seasonality.
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C. Post-Merger Performance
Another implication of the model is that mergers motivated by tax con-
siderations are likely to have smaller synergies and worse post-merger
performance. To test this possibility, we look at the change in net income
of banks that made acquisitions during the Notice window period and
compare it to the change in net income for banks that made acquisitions
during the immediately preceding quarter. We measure the bank-level
change in both net income and net income/assets one and two years after
the Notice window relative to the June 2008 Call Report. Because we
are limited to looking at banks that remain in existence for these two
years, we are only able to observe acquirers (not targets) and the sam-
ple size is relatively small. Moreover, the rapid pace of change during
the financial crisis means that even a one-quarter difference in merger
timing may introduce unobserved differences between groups of banks
that are unrelated to the Notice.1"5
Table 6 presents regressions that test whether merging in the
Notice window affected the change in bank income (or income/assets)
either one year or two years after the Notice. The sample includes merg-
ers that occurred either during the Notice period or in the quarter
immediately before the Notice period. The mergers that took place
immediately before the Notice window are our control group. The sam-
ple sizes are therefore rather small, and we do not include additional con-
trols for this reason.
We find that banks that undertook mergers during the Notice
period had lower growth in net income/assets and net income one
year after the Notice. Two years after the Notice, the result is direc-
tionally consistent, but statistically weaker. These results are consis-
tent with the hypothesis that mergers in the Notice period had lower
synergies, but the small number of mergers and the other disruptions
occurring during the financial crisis make drawing firm conclusions
difficult.
105. Banks that merged prior to the Notice were not motivated by
liberalized use of tax losses. As explained above, the Notice was retroactive,
so both groups of banks were, in fact, able to utilize tax losses of the target
under the Notice. Thus, these tests measure differences in the motivations of
the mergers rather than the ex post tax treatment.
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D. Strategic Recognition of Loan Losses
The Notice protected built-in (unrealized) losses on banks' loan portfo-
lios from Code section 382, but realized losses were unaffected, which
is to say that they continued to be impaired following a change in con-
trol of the bank. This asymmetric treatment provided banks with an
incentive to avoid taking actions that would cause their tax losses to be
realized. The quintessential realization event is a sale. Although we can-
not observe loan sales, we can observe banks' decisions to "charge off"
loans for accounting purposes from their loan reserves.
Section 166 of the Code provides a deduction for debts that
become worthless in whole, or in part, during the taxable year. The
determination of whether a loan is worthless or not is a facts and circum-
stances determination. However, amounts that are "charged off" (i.e.,
deemed uncollectible) for GAAP or regulatory purposes enjoy a conclu-
sive presumption of worthlessness.1"6 Banks account for impaired loans
using an unusual two-step process that does not have a ready explanation
apart from its connection to the tax effects. When a loan is impaired, the
bank must increase its loan-loss reserve. The decision to "charge off" an
amount that is already reflected in the loan-loss reserve does not reflect a
meaningful change in the status of the loan from a financial accounting
or regulatory perspective, but it does give the taxpayer a favorable pre-
sumption for taking a deduction for the uncollectible amount.
Whether a loan is charged off is, to some degree, within the dis-
cretion of the bank. Consumer debt is generally charged off as the debt
becomes 120 or 180 days past due. Classification of commercial debt,
on the other hand, is more flexible and within management's control.
We expect that banks, particularly banks that anticipated being acquired
during the Notice window, would charge off fewer loans than they oth-
erwise would in the fourth quarter of 2008, and that the effect would be
greatest for commercial loans where there is the greatest discretion to
defer the timing of chargeoffs.
Figures 2a through 2d depict the amount of loans charged off as a
share of all loans in default, for commercial loans, revolving lines of credit,
credit cards, and all loans, respectively, as of December 31. Each figure
shows one data series for all banks that merged during the Notice window
and a second data series for banks that did not. Note that the divergence
grew for chargeoffs in 2008 between banks that did and did not merge in
106. I.R.C. § 166(a)(2); Treas. Reg. § 1.166-3(a).
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the Notice window, particularly for commercial loans, but also for revolv-
ing debt. For commercial loans, it appears that the graphs for merged
banks and other banks move together during most of the time period,
with only a short-lived divergence in 2008 and 2009. We do not see the
same decline for credit cards.1"' Taken together, this evidence is consistent
with banks' use of discretion to delay charging off loans strategically to
maximize the value of their tax assets in anticipation of being acquired.
Table 7 reports the results from a series of regressions of the
effect of the Notice window on loan chargeoffs. The unit of observation
is a bank in a given quarter between 2005 and 2015. We regress the char-
geoffs for each category of loans on an indicator variable for the Decem-
ber 31, 2008, Call Report period, an indicator for whether the bank
merged in the Notice window, and the interaction between the two. The
coefficient estimate for this interaction term is our estimate of primary
interest. We also control for the amount of loans in default for that bank
in that quarter, and a collection of month and year variables to capture
seasonal and times trends in loan chargeoffs. Columns (5)-(8) also
include bank fixed effects. We generally find negative effects on the
interaction term, indicating that banks that merged during the Notice
window had an unusually large decline in the amount of chargeoffs that
they made in 2008, with the effect being largest for commercial loans.
The evidence suggests that the Notice had modest effects on
banks' merger behavior. We find little direct evidence of an increase in
mergers, but we do find evidence of lower performance and strategic
recognition of loan losses around the time of the Notice. As a tool for
responding to the crisis, the Notice clearly resulted in a transfer of value
from the Treasury to certain banks, but it is less clear that the Notice had
a dramatic effect on banks' decision to merge. In the next Part, we turn
to the broader question of when and how it makes sense to use the tax
law to respond to a financial crisis.
V. MAKING TAX LAW IN A CRISIS
Notice 2008-83 was not the first time that the exigencies of a financial
crisis left their mark on tax law, and it is unlikely to be the last. In this
107. Although the zero bound on chargeoff rates may be binding in
the case of credit cards.
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Part, we begin with a discussion of Cottage Savings Assn. v. Commis-
sioner,1"8 which arose out of the federal government's response to the
Savings and Loan (S&L) crisis in the 1980s and 1990s. We then turn to
a consideration of how to weigh interventions via tax rules in times of
crisis.
A. Cottage Savings and the S&L Crisis
One of the most consequential recent cases in the Supreme Court's tax
jurisprudence arose in the middle of the S&L crisis of the 1980s and
1990s. In Cottage Savings Assn v. Commissioner, the Court adopted the
IRS's position that an exchange of property constituted a "realization"
event, thereby resulting in a deductible loss if the exchanged property
were worth less than it was purchased for, only if the property were
exchanged for property that was "materially different."1 9 The Court then
held that properties are materially different if they embody "legally dis-
tinct entitlements. 110 The implication of this holding for the taxpayer in
Cottage Savings was that two home purchase loans were treated as
materially different properties even if the obligors on the loans posed
identical risks of default and the loans were secured by mortgages on
adjacent, physically identical properties, which is to say that two prop-
erties can be materially different even if they there are virtually identi-
cal in terms of the economic risks and rewards that they offer.11
The economic context for Cottage Savings is important. The
value of mortgage loan portfolios became impaired by rising interest
rates in the late 1970s and early 1980s, but S&Ls that disposed of these
mortgages so that they could recognize deductible losses for tax pur-
poses would have also been forced to recognize them for regulatory
accounting purposes. Recognizing these bad debts for regulatory
purposes would risk closure by the S&L regulator, the Federal Home
Loan Bank Board (FHLBB). On June 27, 1980, the FHLBB issued a
108. 499 U.S. 554 (1991).
109. Id. at 560.
110. Id. at 566.
111. "Because the participation interests exchanged by Cottage
Savings and the other S&L's derived from loans that were made to different
obligors and secured by different homes, the exchanged interests did embody
legally distinct entitlements. Consequently, we conclude that Cottage Savings
realized its losses at the point of the exchange." Id. at 566.
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memorandum determining that losses from mortgages exchanged for
other, "substantially identical" mortgages need not be reported for reg-
ulatory accounting purposes.112 Mortgages that qualified for this treat-
ment were required to be of similar vintage, secured by the same kinds
of properties with identical interest rates, terms to maturity, and fair
market values, among other commonalities.
Thus, the FHLBB adopted a test of economic equivalence to
determine whether the exchange triggered a loss for regulatory account-
ing purposes, while the Court adopted a test of legal equivalence for
tax accounting purposes. The resulting arbitrage exploited by the tax-
payer (and designed to be exploited by the FHLBB) was a loss for tax
purposes but not for regulatory purposes. The deductible tax loss could
be used to generate refunds from prior year taxes just when the S&Ls
were most in need of liquidity. The Court granted certiorari in Cottage
Savings "[b]ecause of the importance of this issue to the S&L industry
and the conflict among the Circuits over whether memorandum R-49
exchanges produce deductible losses. 113 One way of describing the Cot-
tage Savings decision is in the form of the question posed by Professor
Moran in her 1990 article, Can the Federal Home Loan Bank Board Use
the Internal Revenue Code to Bail out the Ailing Savings and Loan
Industry?114
The legal equivalence requirement for identifying material dif-
ferences changed the treatment of existing transactions and was expected
to have a variety of unintended consequences.11 By enshrining a hair-
trigger rule for the recognition of built-in gains and losses on the
112. Id. at 557 & n.2.
113. Id. at 558.
114. Beverly I. Moran, One Tax Piece of the Savings and Loan Cri-
sis: Can the Federal Home Loan Bank Board Use the Internal Revenue Code
to Bail out the Ailing Savings and Loan Industry?, 22 U. TOL. L. REv. 351, 351
(1990).
115. See Richard H. Nicholls, Cottage Savings: More S&L Prob-
lems?, 45 TAX LAW. 727, 727 (1992) ("The Supreme Court's decision in Cot-
tage Savings Ass'n v. Commissioner, however, raised questions as to whether
a new standard of realization or recognition has upended the field." (footnote
omitted)); Loren D. Prescott, Jr., Cottage Savings Association v. Commis-
sioner: Refining the Concept of-Realization, 60 FORDHAM L. REv. 437, 438 (1991)
(arguing that the "use of this new standard to evaluate other types of transac-
tions for 'material differences' will produce unintended results"); John E.
Capps, Note, In the Wake of Cottage Savings: The Tax Consequences ofDebt
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exchange of property, the case seems to elevate form over substance and
has been mined by commentators for an understanding about the appli-
cability of common law economic substance and substance-over-form
doctrines, which are sometimes used by courts to disallow the tax con-
sequences of certain transactions.116 Professor Weisbach says of the
mortgage swap at issue in Cottage Savings, "it would be difficult to
imagine arranging a transaction so that less actually happens. And there
was no point to the deal other than to raid the Treasury. The business
purpose was precisely zero, not even one-tenth of percent .... Yet the
taxpayer won in Cottage Savings. 117
B. Balancing Short-Term and Long-Term Efficiency in a Crisis
Both Notice 2008-83 and Cottage Savings present instances in which
the response to a crisis was to adopt novel readings of the Code with
uncertain, and possibly negative, effects on long-term economic effi-
ciency, but effects that might be beneficial in the midst of a financial
crisis. Economic analysis of the law has tended to focus on the long-
term efficiency properties of legal rules.118 In the long run, economic out-
put is determined by the potential output of the economy, which, in
turn, is determined by the efficiency of legal rules. When legal rules are
more efficient, potential output grows. But what happens when the econ-
omy is operating below its potential or when an industry is in crisis,
such as during the Great Recession?
Traditionally, there have been two channels through which gov-
ernments have attempted to stimulate the economy: fiscal policy and
monetary policy. Traditional fiscal responses include deficit-financed
Modifications, 72 TEX. L. REV. 2015 (1993) (examining the effect of Cottage
Savings on the modification of outstanding debt).
116. See, e.g., Joseph Bankman, The Economic Substance Doctrine,
74 S. CAL. L. REV. 5, 13-16 (2000); James S. Halpern, Putting the Cart Before
the Horse: Determining Economic Substance Independent of the Language of
the Code, 30 VA. TAX REV. 327, 332-36 (2010); David A. Weisbach, The Fail-
ure of Disclosure as an Approach to Shelters, 54 SMU L. Rev. 73, 75 (2001).
117. Weisbach, supra note 116, at 75.
118. See Lewis Kornhauser, The Economic Analysis of Law, THE
STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY § 1.2 (Edward N. Zalta ed., Fall 2017
ed.), https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fa112017/entries/legal-econanalysis/.
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government spending and tax cuts.1 19 But the Great Recession exposed
significant political disagreement about fiscal stimulus policy,12 and
many countries were reluctant to incur large deficits to prop up demand
for goods and services that would keep resources (including human
resources) from falling idle. 1 Moreover, new government spending
generally requires legislation, which can take a long time to pass even
in the presence of political agreement.
The other traditional policy instrument for stimulating the econ-
omy is monetary policy. However, monetary policy appears to have
been largely ineffective during the Great Recession. Nominal interest
rates approached zero throughout the developed economies, leaving cen-
tral banks with little room to use the traditional lever for stimulating
investment."' The limited effectiveness of traditional monetary policy
necessitated the adoption of unprecedented interventions into the econ-
omy, which were politically fraught and controversial themselves.
Although historically it has been rare for interest rates to approach zero,
interest rates have not rebounded along with the recovery from the Great
119. N. GREGORY MANKIW, PRINCIPLES OF ECONOMICS 814-15 (Jack W.
Calhoun et al. eds., 6th ed. 2012).
120. See, e.g., Alberto Alesina, Fiscal Policy After the Great Reces-
sion, 40 ATL. ECON. J. 429, 430 (2012); Robert Pollin, US Government Deficits
andDebtAmid the Great Recession: What the Evidence Shows, 36 CAMBRIDGE J.
ECON. 161, 162-63 (2012). Enduring controversy over the effects of the Amer-
ican Recovery and Reinvestment Act is evidence of this. American Recovery
and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-5, 123 Stat. 115 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of the U.S.C.). For evidence of the effect of this
stimulus bill on employment, see generally Gabriel Chodorow-Reich et al.,
Does State Fiscal Relief During Recessions Increase Employment? Evidence
from the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act, AM. ECON. J.: ECON. POL.,
Aug. 2012, at 118 (2012); Daniel J. Wilson, Fiscal Spending Jobs Multipliers:
Evidencefrom the 2009 American Recovery and Reinvestment Act, AM. ECON.
J.: ECON. POL., Aug. 2012, at 251 (2012).
121. See Pollin, supra note 120.
122. See generally Michael T. Kiley & John M. Roberts, Monetary
Policy in a Low Interest Rate World, 2017 BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECON. ACTIVITY
317; see also Jing Cynthia Wu & Fan Dora Xia, Measuring the Macroeco-
nomic Impact of Monetary Policy at the Zero Lower Bound, 48 J. MONEY,
CREDIT & BANKING 253, 253 (2016) ("[S]ince December 2008, the federal
funds rate has been near zero, so that lowering it further to produce more stim-
ulus has not been an option.").
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Recession, and economic observers have anticipated that we will bump
up against zero rates of interest more frequently in the future.
In the face of the political infeasibility and economic inefficacy
of traditional fiscal and monetary instruments during the Great Reces-
sion, scholars have brought renewed attention to fiscal mechanisms that
serve as "automatic stabilizers," which increase government spending
and reduce taxes just as macroeconomic indicators become adverse,
without requiring government action.123 More recently, several scholars
have proposed reaching outside of the traditional anti-recession toolkit
to amend other laws, such as environmental regulations and zoning
requirements, to stimulate the economy.124 These scholars have drawn
attention to the fact that even the traditional fiscal and monetary inter-
ventions depend for their effectiveness on the ability of businesses and
households to spend and invest stimulus dollars. Regulations of various
kinds can short-circuit economic stimulus if they interfere with eco-
nomic actors' ability to spend or invest. Certainly, tax rules might be
among the laws that could short-circuit stimulus interventions in a
crisis.
This introduces a trade-off. Some legal rules may be efficient
in the long term but create an obstacle to economic recovery in the short
term, whereas other rules may stimulate demand and lead to increased
employment and incomes in the short run but may reduce potential out-
put if they were adopted on a long-term basis.125 How should we
123. See, e.g., Alisdair McKay & Ricardo Reis, The Role ofAuto-
matic Stabilizers in the U.S. Business Cycle, 84 ECONOMETRICA 141, 144-45
(2016) (providing a literature review of work on stabilizers); see also Zachary
Liscow & William Woolston, Who's In, Who's Out? Policy to Address Job
Rationing During Recessions, 70 Tax L. Rev. 627, 652-54 (2017 (2016); Yair
Listokin, Equity, Efficiency, and Stability: The Importance of Macroeconomics
for Evaluating Income Tax Policy, 29 YALE J. ON REG. 45, 86-88 (2012) (describ-
ing ways to reform tax expenditures to fluctuate less with the business cycle).
124. See, e.g., Andrew Hayashi & Daniel P. Murphy, Savings Pol-
icy and the Paradox of Thrift, 34 YALE J. ON REG. 743 (2017); Zachary Liscow,
Counter- Cyclical Bankruptcy Law: An Efficiency Argument for Employment-
Preserving Bankruptcy Rules, 116 COLUM. L. REV. 1461 (2016); Yair Listokin,
Law and Macroeconomics: The Law and Economics ofRecessions, 34 YALE J.
ON REG. 791 (2017); Jonathan S. Masur & Eric A. Posner, Should Regulation
Be Countercyclical?, 34 YALE J. ON REG. 857 (2017).
125. For example, increases in depositor insurance during the
financial crisis are generally associated with a decrease in depositor discipline
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navigate the trade-off between short-run policies that increase eco-
nomic performance now but reduce economic performance during
normal times? One might be inclined to think that we should design
legal rules solely for their effects on potential output. Of course, the
more time that the economy spends below its potential, the less com-
pelling this intuition is. Thus, there are two reasons why we should
take business cycle management into account if we are concerned
about the efficiency of legal rules.
The first reason is the simple trade-off between the short and
the long run. If the short term is painful enough, and lasts long enough,
then the social welfare advantages of mitigating the downturn may out-
weigh the social welfare disadvantages of adopting rules that reduce
potential output. After all, social welfare over the long run is simply the
sum of social welfare over a number of short-run time intervals. The
second reason to choose rules with the business cycle in mind is that
adverse economic shocks may have lasting effects on potential output
itself. This is the phenomenon known as hysteresis.126 For a variety of
reasons, a negative economic shock may flatten the growth path of the
economy going forward.127 Thus, even maximizing potential output over
a long period of time may require adopting rules that mitigate the last-
ing effects of a financial crisis or deep recession.
There are two ways that we might try to resolve the tension
between mitigating business cycle fluctuations and maximizing poten-
tial output. The first way is to change legal rules when the circumstances
of lending institutions. See generally Allen N. Berger & Rima Turk-Ariss, Do
Depositors Discipline Banks and Did Government Actions During the Recent
Crisis Reduce This Discipline? An International Perspective, 48 J. FIN. SERVS.
RES. 103 (2015). On crisis management, see generally Uriel Rosenthal & Alex-
ander Kouzmin, Crises and Crisis Management: Toward Comprehensive
Government Decision Making, 7 J. PUB. ADMIN. RES. & THEORY 277 (1997).
Prominent economist John Taylor argues that it was government interventions
themselves that caused, prolonged, and deepened the financial crisis. JOHN B.
TAYLOR, GETTING OFF TRACK: How GOVERNMENT ACTIONS AND INTERVENTIONS
CAUSED, PROLONGED, AND WORSENED THE FINANCIAL CRISIS (2009).
126. Hysteresis, OXFORD DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS (John Black et al.
eds., 4th. ed. 2013).
127. See Olivier J. Blanchard & Lawrence H. Summers, Hysteresis
and the European Unemployment Problem, NBER MACROECON. ANN. 1986, at
15 (describing impact of shocks on European unemployment in the 1970s and
1980s).
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warrant and change them back when those circumstances no longer
exist. For example, suppose that a progressive consumption tax maxi-
mizes potential output given the amount of redistribution society pre-
fers, but that an income tax reduces output volatility and curbs economic
downturns much more effectively than a consumption tax. One way to
proceed would be to adopt a consumption tax in the ordinary course but
incorporate more income-tax-like elements during recessions, undoing
those elements after the economy has rebounded. This could happen
through new legislation or if legal rules were designed to change auto-
matically with economic indicators, such as unemployment or the infla-
tion rate.12 The second approach is to choose neither the legal rule that
maximizes potential output nor the legal rule that best mitigates reces-
sions, but instead choose the legal rule that strikes the appropriate balance.
Whether an either/or approach or a compromise approach is preferable
depends on feasibility as well as the costs and benefits of changing
legal rules with the times.
David Kamin has done a thorough analysis of the different
mechanisms by which policy can adjust with economic circumstances.129
As Kamin observes, many scholars have focused on the delegation of
authority by Congress to administrative agencies and the courts to
respond during a crisis, because these branches may be capable of more
rapid responses to swiftly changing conditions than Congress.13 More-
over, there is evidence that courts themselves rule differently depend-
ing on the state of the economy.131 Below, we use Notice 2008-83 and
128. See, e.g., John B. Taylor, The Lack of an Empirical Rationale
for a Revival of Discretionary Fiscal Policy, 99 AM. ECON. REv. 550 (2009);
John B. Taylor, Reassessing Discretionary Fiscal Policy, 14 J. ECON. PERSP.,
Summer 2000, at 21 (advocating for monetary policy that adjusts automati-
cally with macro variables).
129. David Kamin, Legislatingfor Good Times and Bad, 54 HARV.
J. ON LEGIS. 149 (2017).
130. Id. at 152 n.13 (citing Steven Callander & Keith Krehbiel,
Gridlock and Delegation in a Changing World, 58 AM. J. POL. SCI. 819 (2014);
David Epstein & Sharyn O'Halloran, The Nondelegation Doctrine and the Sep-
aration of Powers: A Political Science Approach, 20 CARDOZO L. REV. 947
(1999); Jeffrey E. Shuren, Essay, The Modern Regulatory Administrative State:
A Response to Changing Circumstances, 38 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 291 (2001)).
131. Thomas Brennan et al., Economic Trends and Judicial Out-
comes: A Macrotheory of the Court, 58 DUKE L.J. 1191 (2009).
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Cottage Savings to draw out some important considerations in weigh-
ing the costs and benefits of making crisis-driven tax law.
C. Who Should Do the Balancing?
The Notice and Cottage Savings both involved dramatic legal change
achieved outside of the legislative process. The process of lawmaking
differs, of course, between Congress, the agencies, and the courts. In
this Section we discuss the importance of these differences during
financial or economic crises, which are characterized by fear and
uncertainty about the future, political and psychological pressure on
lawmakers to be seen as doing something, and skepticism regarding
whether the normal mechanisms that automatically stabilize the econ-
omy following modest shocks are adequate for the circumstances. The
most important of these differences are the visibility of the lawmaking
process to the public, the speed of the possible lawmaking response,
and the accountability that those lawmakers have for averting the worst
outcomes of the crisis.
1. Legislators
The primary responsibility for legal changes during a financial or eco-
nomic crisis generally falls on the legislature. Although agency rulemak-
ing and judicial decisions can also respond in a crisis, there are
limitations on the ability of the executive and judicial branches to make
significant changes when circumstances are changing quickly. There is
evidence that judges respond to swings in the business cycle,132 but there
are institutional limitations on courts' ability to be important actors in
changing law to respond to a financial crisis. Courts must wait until a
controversy presents a legal issue that bears on the crisis, and the nature
of the dispute may not lend itself to courts' preferred intervention in the
economy. Agencies can move more nimbly and respond by addressing
exactly the law where they think there may be the biggest stabilizing
effects from a change, but their authority is more limited than that of
Congress.
132. Thomas Brennan et al., The Political Economy of Judging, 93
MINN. L. REV. 1503 (2009); Joana Marinescu, Are Judges Sensitive to Economic
Conditions? Evidencefrom UKEmployment Tribunals, 64 INDUS. & LAB. REL.
REV. 673 (2011).
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And so, it is typically the legislature that responds with both
short-term measures designed to stabilize the financial sector and stim-
ulate the economy, such as the Economic Stimulus Act passed in Feb-
ruary 2008133 and the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act passed
early in 2009,134 and comprehensive structural reforms, such as the Dodd-
Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act.135 Because we
look to Congress to intervene in a financial or economic crisis, its activ-
ities draw heightened scrutiny and pressure.
The expectation that Congress will change the law in a crisis
has the benefit that Congress is a focal point for a flow of information
from the financial sector and the country more generally about economic
conditions. This flow of information can support better policymaking.
On the other hand, pressure on elected legislators to manage a crisis cre-
ates an incentive for them to intervene even when doing nothing may
be the best option. Because the actual effectiveness of policymaking in
a crisis can be difficult to discern and because even legal rules that do
have positive short-term effects may have costs beyond the career hori-
zon of legislators, members of Congress have incentives to make legal
and policy changes regardless of their effect.
For example, ten years after the financial crisis, there remains
a lively debate about the underlying causes of the crisis, with the debate
often being played out along familiar fault lines between those who
argue that the unfettered market resulted in excessive risk-taking and
those who argue that government policy created the conditions for exces-
sive lending through monetary policy and through the federal govern-
ment's reputation for bailing out reckless lenders, a reputation that was
only enhanced during the 2008 crisis. Because circumstances during the
crisis were changing rapidly and because governments at all levels were
making policy changes, it is very difficult to isolate the effect of any one
legal change or policy intervention. This uncertainty gives legislators
plausible deniability about any adverse consequences of legal changes
they make. Moreover, the adverse consequences of crisis-driven law
often do not appear until long after the crisis has passed. The moral haz-
ard created by bailouts results in excessive risk-taking that may not
result in mass defaults or bankruptcy for years. Elected legislators can-
not be held accountable for consequences that arise after they have left
133. Pub. L. No. 110-185, 122 Stat. 613 (2008).
134. See supra Part II.B.
135. See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
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office, and so the feedback needed to create the right incentives for leg-
islators may not exist.
Given the uncertainty about the causes of the 2008 financial cri-
sis, it is perhaps predictable that not only do legislators have a bias in
favor of making legal changes, they also have a bias in favor of more
stringent regulation. In the wake of a financial crisis, as Paul Mahoney
has argued at length, political actors often seek to attribute responsibil-
ity for the crisis to market failures that can be remedied with better or
more regulation.136 Attributing failures to the market deflects blame from
policymakers themselves, and in fact there is evidence that regulatory
activities are cyclical and increase following a crisis.137
Thus, the increased salience of congressional action during a
financial crisis, and the heightened pressure to act in general, create
high-powered incentives for legislators to make legal changes that both
respond to the moment and purport to address the underlying structural
causes of the crisis. At the same time, there are reasons to worry that
political actors do not have the right incentives to make (or not to make)
crisis-driven law that achieves the right balance of short-term stabiliza-
tion and long-run objectives.138
136. Paul G. Mahoney, WASTING A CRISIS: WHY SECURITIES REGULA-
TiON FAILS (2015).
137. Anita Anand & Andrew Green, Securities Settlements as
Examples of Crisis-Driven Regulation, 55 INT'L REv. L. & ECON. 41 (2018);
Anita Anand & Andrew Green, Cross- Country Securities Enforcement as an
Example of Pro- Cyclical Regulation (June 29, 2018), https://papers.ssrn.com
/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid -3205750.2018). It is an open question whether
financial legislation does not happen without a crisis. For an in-progress study
of this point, see Peter Conti-Brown & Michael Ohlrogge, Testing the Crisis-
Legislation Hypothesis Citation Indexing and the Measurement ofLegislative
Importance (Sept. 26, 2019) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author)
("Legal scholars and others frequently assert that financial legislation in
the US is invariably crisis-driven. This 'crisis legislation' hypothesis is often
cited as an explanation for various supposed shortcomings of US financial
legislation, such as that it is ill-conceived, inadequate to the problems it aims
to address, and subject to various forms of popular pressures. Despite the
prevalence of the crisis legislation hypothesis, however, it has never been
tested empirically.").
138. Although we do not discuss it here, decisions by Congress to
amend substantive tax will generally have consequences on states as well,
because state income tax laws generally hew closely to the Code. See Ruth
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2. Agency Rulemakers
Notice 2008-83 was issued quietly, without fanfare, in a manner that
belied its significance. IRS Notices, like other forms of administrative
guidance such as Revenue Rules and Revenue Procedures, are not given
the same judicial deference as Treasury Regulations, which are subject
to the notice and comment process. 139 On the one hand, this means that
guidance of this sort can be delivered much more quickly than the prom-
ulgation of regulations or, certainly, new legislation. Speed is often per-
ceived to be crucial during a financial crisis, when circumstances may
be changing hourly.
On the other hand, the notice and comment process often pro-
duces important observations and concerns about proposed rules. State
and national tax bar associations have considerable expertise and a gen-
erally good track record of working with Treasury officials. Without
this consultation, it is more likely that there will be unintended conse-
quences flowing from important changes in the IRS's interpretations of
the law, which may either burden taxpayers in ways that are unneces-
sary given the objectives of the law or may create loopholes that will
subsequently need to be fixed.
The stakes are higher when crisis-driven law doesn't have an
expiration date. The Notice was effectively overruled in only four months
by legislation, but it is unclear how long its interpretation would have
survived even if it hadn't been overruled. The IRS claimed to be"studying" the question of how to treat built-in losses on banks' loan
Mason, Delegating Up: State Conformity with the Federal Tax Base, 62
DUKE L.J. 1267 (2013).
139. The standard of review applicable to IRS Revenue Rulings has
long been unclear. See John F. Coverdale, Chevron's Reduced Domain: Judicial
Review of Treasury Regulations and Revenue Rulings After Mead, 55 ADMIN. L.
REV. 39 (2003) (arguing at the time that Revenue Rulings where entitled to more
deference than mere litigating positions of the IRS under Mead and Skidmore);
John F. Coverdale, Court Review of Tax Regulations and Revenue Rulings in
the Chevron Era, 64 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 35 (1995) (arguing that Chevron defer-
ence is an inappropriate standard for reviewing Treasury Regulations and
Revenue Rulings); Linda Galler, Judicial Deference to Revenue Rulings: Rec-
onciling Divergent Standards, 56 OHIo ST. L.J. 1037 (1995) (documenting
increasing deference to Revenue Rulings, albeit under different standards). But
see Paul L. Caron, Tax Myopia Meets Tax Hyperopia: The Unproven Case of
Increased Judicial Deference to Revenue Rulings, 57 OHIO ST. L.J. 637 (1996).
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portfolios, and it is perfectly conceivable that after the financial crisis
had passed that the IRS would have, upon revisiting the issue, concluded
that banks' loan losses were in fact subject to the Code section 382 lim-
itation once the urgency of recapitalizing the banks had passed. On the
other hand, there may be reason to worry that it would be difficult for
the IRS to take back the favorable treatment of banks' loans under Code
section 382 after the financial industry had become accustomed to that
favorable treatment.
The fact that IRS guidance is not subject to public review and
comment before it is promulgated perhaps increases the risk that agency
capture or even outright corruption could lead to biased rulemaking.141
It is exactly these sorts of concerns about the Notice, specifically that the
IRS was inappropriately influenced by the parties to the Wells Fargo-
Wachovia acquisition, that led to the investigation discussed in Part II.
Financial crises are also typified by selective federal intervention on
behalf of market participants, of those adjudged to be systemically
important or "too big to fail." These judgments naturally create the per-
ception, and the real risk, that lawmakers will use public resources not
only to aid economic actors that have an important stabilizing role in
the financial or economic system but also those with which they have a
personal relationship and from which they stand to benefit.
As discussed above, however, public review is no panacea for
rational rulemaking even in the best of times. Jon Elster has argued that
emotions such as fear and anger are often triggered by financial crises,
and these emotions play an underappreciated role in lawmaking, includ-
ing even at the time of constitution drafting. Because these emotions
tend to undermine rational thinking, their influence forces us to rethink
the view that constitutions act as a rational check on ordinary lawmak-
ing, which is fickle and subject to the whims of the moment.141 Of course,
agency employees are not immune to these same passions and emotions.
Whether the opaque nature of agency lawmaking is beneficial because
it insulates more rational lawmakers from the unreasonable demands
140. Agencies also operate in close relationship with the president
and political parties. See Michael A. Livermore, Political Parties and Presi-
dential Oversight, 67 ALA. L. REV. 45 (2015).
141. Jon Elster, The Political Psychology of Constitution Making,
in CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLIES, COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW AND POLICY
207, 216-35 (Jon Elster et at. eds., 2018).
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of the public is an open, and important, empirical question worthy of
further study.142
Agency regulators and judges also face different incentives and
expectations than legislators during a financial crisis. The role of gov-
ernment agencies and the courts is not generally thought to encompass
business cycle management or making important legal changes to mit-
igate the effects of a financial crisis. Courts and agencies do make law
of course, but the primary responsibility for responding to rapidly dete-
riorating economic or financial circumstances typically falls on the leg-
islature. Although courts and regulators may act as accomplices, or at
least not obstacles, to congressional changes in law, they do not gener-
ally lead the way.
This difference in expectations around crisis-driven lawmaking
means that judges and regulators are less accountable, at least to the pub-
lic, for failures to change the law during a crisis. This means that they
may not respond with sufficient urgency to a nascent crisis, but it also
means that they do not face the same public pressure to be seen as act-
ing. Without this pressure, courts and regulators who are inclined to
make law in a crisis can focus on making legal changes that will best
achieve a trade-off between rule of law stability and long-run objectives
with the urgency of the moment rather than on making highly salient
and visible interventions designed to satisfy the public's demand that
government do something.
3. Courts
The third source of crisis-driven law is the courts. The decision in Cot-
tage Savings is one of the most consequential examples of this, and it
serves as a helpful counterpoint to the Notice. We cannot know what
would have become of the Notice's interpretation of Code section
382 as it applied to banks' loan portfolios, since that interpretation was
142. As one scholar notes, "[t]he benefits derived from the general
rule of public participation are sometimes nonexistent or outweighed by other
circumstances." Lavilla, supra note 14, at 319 (footnote omitted); see also
Guardian Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Fed. Say. & Loan Ins. Corp., 589 F.2d 658,
663 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (noting that there are instances in which benefits of pub-
lic participation are outweighed by other considerations); BONFIELD, supra
note 14, pt. 6, § 6.81 (discussing how public participation may be unnecessary,
impracticable, or contrary to public interest).
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overruled by statute only three months later. In any event, the effects of
the Notice over the long haul would probably be rather modest, since it
is an infrequent enough occurrence that banks have very large built-in
losses on their loan portfolios. Thus, the "overhang" from a legal change
tailor-made to help banks in financial distress would be relatively small,
because the distortive effects on the bank M&A market during ordinary
times would be small.
By contrast, the Court's decision in Cottage Savings, which
resulted in a "hair-trigger" rule for the realization of gains and losses
on the disposition of property has consequences for anyone who disposes
of property. The effects are far-reaching and frequent, both during finan-
cial crises and during ordinary times. It is not only distressed banks
that can selectively recognize tax losses without changing their eco-
nomic position, but all taxpayers at all times.
There is nothing inherent in the nature of agency rulemaking
and guidance that limits it to legal questions with less economic conse-
quence than tax law made by the courts, but there is a crucial difference
in the ability and speed with which the IRS can change its interpretations
of existing law. The IRS can, at any time, change its position whereas
lower courts are bound by the decisions of appellate courts, and it is rare
for appellate courts, including the Supreme Court, to overrule their prec-
edents. Thus, agencies are less likely than courts to make crisis-driven
law that persists well beyond the crisis for which that law is suitable.
The other obstacle to courts playing a role in adapting law to a
crisis, and then adapting it back once the crisis has passed, is that courts
must wait until a controversy presents the legal issue to them. There is
no obvious relationship between the timing of when a crisis requires a
change in law and when a controversy will appear before a court, other
than that there will be a lag. The fact that courts must wait for litigation
before acting also ensures that the overhang from any change in law
made during a crisis into non-crisis periods will almost certainly be lon-
ger than that from agency rulemaking.
CONCLUSION
It is almost inherent in the notion of a crisis that the normal pace and
processes by which legal rules should change do not apply, and the sub-
stantive trade-offs between short-term and long-term objectives are
recalibrated to place greater weight on the present. This does not mean
that crisis-driven lawmaking should treat process as irrelevant or dis-
regard the future entirely, but in the fearful and chaotic climate of a
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financial crisis, the ideal processes and agent of legal change may be
different than during periods of normal politics.
Notice 2008-83 suspended a longstanding tax rule that, while
controversial, served worthy tax policy objectives: discouraging loss
trafficking and helping to ensure that business assets remained in the
hands of the managers who could make them most profitable rather than
in the hands of those who could simply make greater use of tax losses
that had accrued in prior years. Moreover, this change in law was unex-
pected and was made without input from the tax community. The Notice
has been panned as unlawful, and perhaps it was. In this Article, how-
ever, we test whether it mattered for substantive policy outcomes.
Although we cannot measure the costs the Notice may have had for the
legitimacy of the IRS or the rule of law, or the benefits in terms of mak-
ing cash infusions to the financial sector, we can report evidence on
whether the Notice undermined the purposes of Code section 382.
We find that the Notice had no discernible effect on merger
activity and consolidation in the banking sector, although it did have a
modest effect on the kinds of mergers that took place. Our evidence sug-
gests that Code section 382 does result in more efficient bank mergers
than would otherwise take place, and, as a result, the Notice had eco-
nomic costs that lasted beyond the financial crisis.
[Vo l 23:1
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Figure 1: Bank and BHC Mergers by Month: 2007-2011
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Table 2: Variables and Descriptions
This Table presents descriptions of our bank variables. 4
Variable Description
Al-loans/assets Asset Quality: Total Loans/Total Assets. Source:
Call Report.
A2-realestateloans/loans Asset Quality: Real Estate Loans/Total Assets.
Source: Call Report.
A3-comindloans/loans Asset Quality: Commercial and Industrial
Loans/Total Assets. Source: Call Report.
A4-realestate/assets Asset Quality: Other Real Estate Owned/Total
Assets. Source: Call Report.
143. Many of these variables are drawn from David C. Wheelock
& Paul W. Wilson, Why Do Banks Disappear? The Determinants of U.S.
Bank Failures and Acquisitions, 82 REv. ECON. & STAT. 127 (2000).
X
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Table 2: Variables and Descriptions (continued)
Variable Description
A5-interest/assets Asset Quality: Interest Owed, but Not Collected/
Total Assets. Source: Call Report.
A6-badloans/assets Asset Quality: Non-performing Loans/Total
Assets. Source: Call Report.
Assets Total Assets. Source: Call Report.
CAPAD Capital Adequacy. Total Equity/Total Assets.
Source: Call Report.
Chargeoffs Chargeoffs on Loans and Leases. Source: Call
Reports.
Net Income Net Income After Taxes/Total Assets. Source:
Call Reports.
ETR Difference Taxes/Pretax Income ofAcquirer - Taxes/Pretax
Income of Target. Source: Call Reports.
Liquidity (Federal Funds Purchased - Federal Funds
Sold)/Total Assets. Source Call Reports.
Pretax Income Taxes/Pretax Income ofAcquirer - Taxes/Pretax
Income of Target. Source: Call Reports.
Nonperforming Loans Loans That Are 90 Days Past Due and Accruing
Interest or No Longer Accruing Interest. Source:
Call Reports.
Reserves Balance of allowancefor loan and lease losses.
Source: Call Reports.
Size Log of Total Assets. Source: Call Report.
Taxes Applicable Income Taxes. Source: Call Reports.
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Table 4: Likelihood of Becoming a Target for non-BHCs (Pooled
Panel Logit Regressions)
This Table presents pooled panel logit regressions with the dependent
variable an indicator that takes the value 1 if the bank was a merger tar-
get during the period following each quarterly call report and 0 other-
wise. The Notice Window indicator corresponds to the call report period
beginning 9/31/2008. All variables are as described in Table 2.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
CAPAD
Liquidity
Net Income/Assets
Nonperforming
Loans
Size (ln(Assets))
TEDRATE
Notice Window
Notice Window x
Nonperforming
Loans
Notice Window x
Liquidity
Notice Window x
CAPAD
Notice Window x
Net Income/Assets
Notice Window x
Size-ln(assets)
Constant
-0.00891
(-0.02)
-2.177***
(-7.17)
-24.12**
(-5.11)
7.86-'
(0.07)
0.138***
(5.42)
0.163**
(2.19)
-0.00693
(-0.02)
-2.171***
(-7.15)
-23.89***
(-5.06)
9.38-'
(0.08)
0.138***
(5.41)
0.0122
(0.10)
0.409
(1.46)
-0.00757
(-0.02)
-2.171***
(-7.15)
-23.92***
(-5.07)
0.000000184
(0.16)
0.138***
(5.41)
0.0122
(0.10)
0.423
(1.50)
-0.00000151
(-0.34)
0.0455
(0.10)
-2.156***
(-6.91)
-25.66***
(-5.07)
-5.90-'
(-0.05)
0.147***
(5.65)
0.0142
(0.11)
2.564*
(1.76)
0.00000296
(0.67)
-0.0981
(-0.08)
-1.334
(-0.58)
18.03
(1.31)
-0.172
(-1.44)
-6.677*** -6.639*** -6.639*** -6.745***
(-21.34) (-21.22) (-21.23) (-21.16)
N 216111 216111 216111 216111
**
* - '
C
.~ c~1
~
~-, 0
-~ ~)
-~ ~)
~-, ~-,
0-
c~
o C~
~
C
-~
~-, 0
- -
bJj ~
-4-~ -~
0
~, 0
*
%n
I1
*
*
*
* *
* * *
oog~j ~ OOC~ ~
~- ~-
~ 6
*
*
* ,-'
*
*
*
~
0
o
o
~ H0 ~.-
0 ~- ~
0 -= - 0
0 N
c H
7T C
7T
*
*
* ,-'
~ Cl
*
-> C> * ,-n
• ,-' ,-'
7T 0 T I
Cl
C> Cl
** ,-'* '~c~ ~-
~ Cl
** ,-* '
o* S
o-
X X x Cl
0
0 0 0 0
© © © © ©0
Z Z Z Z
C'CA
~-, 0
C~
E t
00 m Oct~
U~
u~
0 7T
CD C
CD
40o I CC '6 6
"n
o h r
rq
sm) 0n-
u
0 = Z
*n
00 *q 0, -
,j r- * 0 ,
7T ~ - c
cl
V
QQ
~ 0
c~
o -
Q
I.n 00 0C
00 l
M
*
' o
* n
0
0
0 ~
0
l n,z,
*
*n
Q
cq
I
%c
7T
V
QQ
*
*
* -'_%~
%n~0
Cl% ~
6
*
*
Florida Tax Review
APPENDIX: A MODEL OF THE EFFECTS OF CODE SECTION 382
ON MERGERS
This Section presents a more general model of the effect of Code sec-
tion 382 on the decision to merge. The model predicts that, to the extent tax
losses are an important consideration in the merger decision, mergers tak-
ing place during the period that the Notice was in effect should be more
numerous and exhibit lower merger synergies. The model has ambiguous
predictions for how financial distress would affect the likelihood of
becoming a target, and the social welfare implications of 382 are ambigu-
ous as well. The model applies equally to the cases of a target corporation
with either net operating losses (NOLs) or built-in losses on its assets, so
long as the cost of recognizing those losses is sufficiently small.
A. The Model Setup
There are two players (i e {b, s}) and four time periods with no discount-
ing (te {0,1,2,3 }). An acquiring corporation (i = b) and a target corpora-
tion (i=s) explore a possible business combination. For the sake of
simplicity, both corporations are subject to the same corporate income tax
rate of re (0,1). Let's first start with the target corporation. The target
has a certain amount of tax losses (L > 0) the firm has accumulated over
the years that the firm can use to reduce its taxable income in the future.
If the target corporation were to stay independent, the firm expects to
realize future income with a present value of Ys > 0, before deducting
any losses. If Ys > L, the firm will pay an income tax of c(Y -L), whereas
if Y < L, the firm will not pay any corporate income tax. The after-tax
income for the stand-alone target, therefore, is Y - r max {Y -L,0}.
Whether the target has sufficient taxable income in the future
to take advantage of the tax losses is an important separator. Assume
that the target's future income is uncertain ex ante but is distributed
with a differentiable probability density function off() over the sup-
port of Ys e [0,Y s) where Fs >> 0 and Fs > 0 VY. Based onL and Ys,
we can divide the target into two groups. If Y >L, the target has suffi-
cient income to be able to utilize all tax losses. The target will expect to
realize an after-tax income of Y- r(Y- L) =(1 - c)Y + cL. If Ys <L, on
the other hand, the target does not generate sufficient income to be
able to use the tax losses. In this case, the target will have an after-tax
income equal to pretax income: Y. We refer to the first type of target
corporation (with Y >L) as "financially healthy" and the latter type
(with Y < L) as "financially weak."
[Vo l 23:1
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Turning to the acquiring corporation (i = b), if the buyer were
to stay independent and not acquire the target, the buyer expects to
realize a future income of Yb > 0 and after-tax income of(1 - c)Yb. If the
buyer were to acquire the target corporation, the combined corporation
would generate, due to operational synergies, additional income
X e (X, X) where X << 0 and X >> 0. Assume that X has a differen-
tiable probability density function of g(') where > 0. V X.144 The oper-
ational synergy will increase the combined company's taxable income
by X, such that the combined company's pretax income is Yb + Ys +X.
In terms of timing of the game, at t= 0, tax law on losses is
fixed. At t= 1, the target corporation's stand-alone income (Ys) and the
operational synergy (X) are realized and observed by both corpora-
tions."' Both players also observe all other relevant parameters (such
as Yb and L), so that the business combination negotiation is done in a
complete, symmetric information setting. For simplicity, we assume
that the buyer's stand-alone taxable income is large enough to utilize
the target's tax losses: Yb L. At t = 2, the buyer and the seller negotiate
over a possible business combination. Also for simplicity, we assume
that the business combination is executed as a tax-free (or tax-deferred)
reorganization. In case a combination is consummated, the buyer cap-
tures Se (0,1) share of the benefits (which can come from either opera-
tional synergy, tax benefits, or both) and the seller captures 1 - 35 share
of the benefits.146 At t = 3, taxable income and, in case there was a busi-
ness combination at t = 2, synergies are realized.
144. We are assuming, for simplicity, that the merger synergies
and other attributes are uncorrelated with the accumulated losses of the tar-
get. Relaxing this assumption will not change the main results.
145. The assumption that the target's stand-alone income and,
more importantly, the potential synergy from the merger are stochastic vari-
ables implies that the companies do not know whether they should merge
until they observe the realizations.
146. The relative bargaining power (6) can represent various fac-
tors, including the market conditions, that allow either the target or the buyer
to capture a bigger deal surplus. For instance, when there is a strong competi-
tion among many buyers for a single target, S5will get closer to zero. We can
easily reflect such an equilibrium by letting multiple buyers draw realizations
on X and compete for a single target. We are also assuming away any costs
associated with executing a merger. We can easily incorporate the transac-
tion's cost by letting the buyer and the seller to capture less than the full sur-
plus from the transaction.
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B. No Limitation on Use of Tax Losses for the
Combined Company
We start with the case where a business combination between the buyer
and the target does not lead to a limitation on the use of the target's tax
losses, which approximates the case of banks during the Notice window
or a world in which Code section 382 did not exist. We can divide the set
of possible business combinations depending on the target's type. Sup-
pose first that Ys > L, so that the target is financially healthy. If the par-
ties were to stay independent, the buyer and the seller will realize
after-tax, stand-alone incomes of (1 -,) Y + 'L and (1 -,) Yb, respectively.
These represent the parties' respective reservation values, the minimum
value they must capture from the merger. If they were to merge, the
combined company will pay an income tax of c(Yb + Ys +X- L) and
realize an after-tax income of (1- c)(Yb + Ys+X) + cL. Note that the
expression allows the combined entity to fully utilize the tax losses from
the target corporation. The gain from the merger, therefore, is given by
(1 - )X
Without any limitation on the use of target's tax losses, there is
an after-tax gain from a merger whenever the operational synergy is
positive: X 0. For financially healthy targets, allowing unlimited use of
tax losses is neutral and non-distortionary, encouraging business com-
binations if and only if there are operational synergies. When the par-
ties execute the transaction, the buyer will obtain an additional return of
5(1 - c)Xwhile the seller realizes an additional return of (1 - 5)(1 - ')X
Now consider a possible business combination with a financially
weak target (Y < L). If the parties were to stay independent, at t = 3, the
buyer and the seller expect to realize after-tax incomes of (1 -'r)Yb and
Y, respectively. In case of a business combination, the combined com-
pany will realize an after-tax income of (1 -'r)(Yb + Y +X) + rL. Note
that, by assumption, the buyer's taxable income is sufficiently high so
that the combined company will be able to fully utilize the target's tax
losses. The gain from the merger is given by
,C(L - Y) + (1 - O)X
Note that, by assumption, L > Y, and the gain from this merger
is also greater than the gain from a merger with a financially healthy
target generating the same synergies. For the financially weak seller,
[Vo l 23:1
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therefore, without any limitation on the use of tax losses, the parties
will have two distinct incentives to merge: a possible operational syn-
ergy (X) and the ability to tap into the underutilized tax losses (L - Ys).
The presence of the tax benefits in the merger implies that even if the
operational synergy is small or negative, the parties will have an incen-
tive to merge. That is, so long as X - - (L-Y), the benefit of1-T
merger is (weakly) positive and the tax benefits grow as the tax rate
rises and the amount of underutilized tax losses by the target grows.
Note that - -(L - Y) < 0, so that the merger may produce a nega-1-"
tive operational synergy but still generate a sufficiently large tax bene-
fit to make it attractive for the parties. Thus, for the financially weak
seller, the absence of a limit on the use of tax losses following an acqui-
sition is distortionary in the sense that it encourages the parties to
merge even when merger will destroy value.
C. Limitation on the Use of Tax Losses for the
Combined Company
Now, suppose that when the target and the buyer merge, there is a limit
such as that imposed by Code section 382 on how much of target's tax
losses the combined company can utilize. We can let the limitation on
the target's tax losses be proportional to the target's future income. Let
lYs, where fi e (0,1), represent the maximum amount of the target's tax
losses that the combined company can use. The assumption represents
the fact that the limitation is determined by multiplying the company's
equity value (target's future income) by the long-term tax-exempt rate
and that this rate is lower than the return on the target's assets. Given
that the ceiling on the target's tax losses is proportionate to the target's
future income, the buyer that merges with a financially healthy target
company will be able to use more of the target's past tax losses than the
company that merges with a financially weak target company.
Due to the loss limitation, target corporations can be divided
into three different groups. The first group includes the financially health-
iest targets, those that generate enough income on their own to use all
of the tax losses even if the limitation applied: Y > L. The second
group includes moderately healthy target companies such that the stand-
alone target can utilize the entire tax loss but the combined company
cannot: Y > L >i Y. The third group includes only financially weak tar-
get companies, with relatively low stand-alone taxable income such
2019]
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that neither the stand-alone target nor the combined company can uti-
lize all the tax losses: L > Y > lY. Let's examine these three groups in
turn.
With respect to the financially healthy seller (Y > fiY >L), the
respective parties' reservation values are (1 -c)Y + iL for the seller,
and (1 - c)Yb for the buyer. If they were to merge, the combined com-
pany will realize after-tax income of(1 -'r)(Y b + Y +X) + iL. Note that,
even with the loss limitation, the target's stand-alone taxable income is
large enough so that the combined company can still utilize all the tax
losses. Hence, the loss limitation rule creates no distortions on merg-
ers. The gains from the merger are given by (1 -'r)X, and the parties
will have an incentive to merge whenever the operational synergy is
positive.
Turning to the moderately healthy target corporations, the par-
ties' reservation values are the same as in the case with financially
healthiest targets, i.e., (1- c)Y+ cL for the seller and (1- c)Yb for the
buyer. If the companies were to merge, the combined company will pay
an income tax of 'r (Yb + Y +X- fi Y) and realize an after-tax income
of (1 - c)(Y b + Y +X) + cf8Y. The gains from the merger are, therefore,
given by (1- c)X- (L -flY). Note that, because of the loss limita-
tions, the combined company is worse off by c(L- fiY) than the target
and acquirer would be, in aggregate, by remaining separate. To justify
a merger, they will need a strictly positive operational synergy:
X > I (L-J8Y) > 01-T
This threshold level of synergy prevents certain economically
efficient mergers from taking place and is the distortion caused by the
loss limitation. The threshold grows with the tax rate and the foregone
tax benefits due to the limitation
Finally, the acquisition of a financially weak target corpora-
tion will produce a combined company that pays income tax of
r" (Yb + Y +X- flY) and realizes after-tax income of (1 -i)(Y b + Y +X) +
rfiY. The gains from the merger are -r(1- fi)Y+ (1- c)X. Now, in
order for the parties to merge, they will need an operational synergy
that is sufficiently positive to cover the tax loss that results from the
NOL limitation. That is:
X (1-f)Y, > 01-T
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Thus, the limitation will discourage the acquisition of financially weak
targets and prevent mergers that generate positive operational efficien-
cies. This effect grows with the tax rate and the target's income, and as
/3 falls.
Minimum Operational No Limitation on Limitation on the Use
Synergy (X) Necessary for the Use of Target's of Target's Tax Losses
Business Combination Tax Losses (ftYI)
Financially Strong Target X >0 X > 0
(,>1Y,3>L)
Moderately Healthy Target X >0 X > - (L- IY) > 0
(,_>L >8 Y,) 1-
Financially Weak Target X> (L-Y) X>- (1 -/)Y >0
(L > Y,>/Y,) 11r
The Table above summarizes the main findings by tabulating
the minimum operational synergy necessary for a business combination.
With respect to financially healthy target corporations, for whom the
limitation on tax losses does not create a binding constraint, we get the
optimal merger incentive regardless of whether a limitation applies (sec-
ond row). For moderately healthy target corporations (Ys>L>PiYs),
limiting the use of tax loss carryforwards for merged corporations
causes distortions on merger incentives. In that case, the combined
company's operational synergy must be large enough to cover the loss
of tax assets (third row). For financially weak target corporations
(L> Ys > 3 Ys), we get different types of distortions depending on the
rule (fourth row). Without any limitations on the use of losses, the tax
losses create an incentive for inefficient acquisitions. With limitations
on use of losses, on the other hand, we get the opposite distortion. Sim-
ilar to the case of moderately healthy target corporations, the weak tar-
gets are less inclined to execute a merger due to the loss of tax benefits
(r(1 -/3)Ys). Now, operational synergies must be strictly positive for a
merger to make sense and, as a result, too few mergers will take place.
D. Comparative Statics and Predictions
While the model is simple, it leads to a number of predictions. First,
when we lift the restriction on the use of target's tax losses, the incidence
20191
Florida Tax Review
of business combinations (on average) should rise. While the rule has
no effect on the financially healthy target corporations, for both moder-
ately healthy and financially weak target corporations, they need
smaller operational synergies to be able to consummate a merger. Sec-
ond, in addition to the general rise in the incidence of business combi-
nations, when the restriction on the use of tax losses is eliminated,
mergers will exhibit (on average) smaller operational synergies. Again,
for financially healthy target corporations, the rule change has no effect.
For moderately healthy target corporations, now mergers with smaller
operational synergies become feasible. For financially weak target cor-
porations, the operational synergy can even be negative.
Third, in terms of whether lifting the loss restriction will induce
more financially strong (or financially weak) targets to be acquired, the
model is agnostic. First note that, conditional on the target's stand-alone
income, the increase in the range of operational synergies that become
subject to a possible business combination is the same for both moder-
ately healthy and financially weak targets: for both types, the range of
X for a possible merger increases by _- (1-f8Y). However, because1-T
the distribution (or the density) of X can be large or small within the
relevant range, eliminating the restriction on the use of tax losses could
lead to a higher incidence of acquisition of either the moderately healthy
or financially weak target. The change in the rule, of course, has no
effect on the financially healthy target. Fourth, changing the tax loss
rule will have an ambiguous welfare effect. With respect to the moder-
ately healthy target, lifting a limitation on the use of tax losses will
unambiguously increase welfare by making all mergers with positive
operational synergies feasible. For the financially weak targets, on the
other hand, lifting the restriction leads to too many mergers. Depend-
ing on the magnitude of the inefficiency, loss limitations like Code sec-
tion 382 could either increase or decrease welfare.
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